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1. Introduction 
Early work on the dynamics of pay suggested that being in low paid employment increases the 
chances of both future low paid employment and unemployment (Stewart and Swaffield, 1999, 
and Stewart, 2007). However, this literature does not consider the possibility that low pay may 
also lead to higher pay. As we show below, following individuals over time between 1991 and 
2008 using data from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), about 26 (40) per cent of low-
paid women (men) are in higher paying jobs in the subsequent year. Despite these high 
percentages, presently, the literature has paid little attention to the empirical possibility that low 
pay itself may have a low-pay to higher-pay stepping stone effect. The core objective of this 
paper is to develop and estimate a dynamic multinomial logit model of employment which will 
allow us to examine the dynamic relationship between no-pay, low-pay and higher-pay outcomes 
simultaneously. For the sake of completeness we also include in the analysis self-employment, 
an employment status typically ignored in the relevant literature. The policy contribution of this 
paper is that it will inform the debate surrounding welfare policies designed to facilitate the 
transition from welfare to work.  
We show that both state-dependence and stepping stone effects of low pay are present among 
British workers after observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity has been accounted for. 
Our results also show that, other things being equal, people who are on low pay are more likely 
to be in employment in the future than those who are either unemployed or not in the labour 
force. However, we also show that people on low pay are not more likely to become jobless in 
the future than their higher pay counterparts. Simply put, the paper looks for but does not find 
any evidence for a low pay-no pay cycle among British workers.  
The paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature; Section 3 describes the 
econometric model and estimation strategy; Section 4 discusses the data and model specification; 
Section 5 presents the estimation results; and Section 6 tests for and discusses panel attrition 
bias, and Section 7 sets out the conclusion. 
2. Literature review 
Whether there is a low wage-no wage cycle or whether low paid jobs act as stepping stones to 
higher paid jobs are essentially empirical issues. However, there are some theoretical 
underpinnings based on human capital, signalling and job search effects. Acemoglu (1995) 
assumes that human capital deteriorates during unemployment spells and its maintenance is 
costly and non-observable, so that employers tend to avoid hiring unemployed workers. This 
results in the probability of exiting from unemployment declining with its duration 
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(unemployment persistence).Hence, Vishwanath (1989) suggests firms may use unemployment 
duration as an indicator of employability simply because higher ability workers are more likely 
to have shorter unemployment spells. In contrast, Pissarides (1990) argues that unemployment 
does not have to be stigmatising. As there are generally fewer high quality jobs around than low 
quality ones it may pay the more highly skilled to wait for an appropriate high skilled vacancy to 
appear and employers may anticipate such a strategy. 
2. Whether having a low paid job is better than no job at all depends on factors such as age, 
gender and level of education (Mostav, 2014). If employee skills are improved through low wage 
employment this may well result in a stepping stone effect into higher paid jobs, However,  the 
accumulation of human capital in such jobs is often limited and employers may interpret such 
jobs as providing a negative signal, particularly in the case of those who are more highly 
qualified. In such an environment McCormick (1990) discusses why redundant skilled workers 
may be reluctant to accept interim low skilled jobs. If skilled work is more satisfying or less 
arduous for highly productive workers, then such workers will tend to invest more in moving 
quickly between skilled jobs. Consequently, high productivity workers tend to engage in on-the-
job search rather than take up interim jobs. If individual differences in productivity are known to 
the worker but not to the potential employer, then this type of search strategy may be used as a 
signal of productivity. Imperfect information is a key issue in all these models. 
There is a sizable body of literature examining low paid employment with a focus on state-
dependence of low pay – that is, whether and to what extent current low paid employment 
increases the probability of remaining in low pay in the future (see for instance, Sloane and 
Theodossiou, 1996; Stewart and Swaffield 1999; Cappellari 2002, 2007; Cappellari and Jenkins 
2008; Clarke and Kanellopoulos 2013; and Fok et al. 2015). The interest in state-dependence of 
low pay arises from a concern that with increasing earnings inequality, if there is state-
dependence of low pay (i.e., low pay is persistent), life-time earnings inequality will increase as 
well. Indeed, state-dependence of low pay has been found in a number of studies (among them, 
Stewart and Swaffield 1999; Cappellari 2002; Clarke and Kanellopoulos 2013; and Fok et al. 
2015) even after individual heterogeneity is controlled for.  
However, there is another possible effect of low pay, to which earlier studies have paid little 
attention – that is, the effect of current low pay on influencing the probability of moving to 
higher pay in the future. We will refer to this possibility as a stepping stone effect of low pay. To 
be consistent with the earlier literature, we will continue to use the term state-dependence to 
refer to the first type of state-dependence of low pay (i.e. its persistence).  
Answers to the question whether and to what extent low paid employment has a stepping stone 
effect are particularly relevant to policy makers. From a welfare policy perspective, if low pay 
employment acts as a stepping stone to higher pay, welfare reforms that promote employment, 
even if it is low paid, such as the work-first approach to welfare recipients, have a chance of 
improving the financial well-being of welfare recipients over time and should therefore be 
considered as potentially welfare-improving policies. This study extends the literature by 
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estimating a dynamic multinomial logit model to examine both the state-dependence and the 
stepping stone effects of low pay. 
It appears that there are only two studies that take a similar modelling approach to the analysis 
contained in this paper, namely Uhlendorff (2006) and Fok et al. (2015). Using the German 
Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) waves 1998 to 2003, Uhlendorff (2006) examines low pay 
dynamics of German men and finds that there exists genuine state-dependence of low pay as well 
as of non-employment. However, unlike Uhlendorff (2006) who treats unemployment and not in 
the labour force (NILF) as one labour force state (i.e., non-employment), our present study 
models the two non-employment states separately. The distinction between NILF and 
unemployment is particularly important in estimating the stepping stone effect of low pay since 
the stepping stone effect may differ, depending on whether low paid employment is compared 
with NILF or with unemployment.  
Fok et al. (2015) examine the dynamics of low paid employment in Australia, using the 
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. Both state dependent 
and stepping stone effects of low pay are found in that study. Although that study uses an 
extended definition of unemployment to include those who are marginally attached to the labour 
market in the analysis, it excludes those who are not in the labour force and not marginally 
attached to the labour market, as well as those who are self-employed, which may lead to sample 
selection bias in their estimation.   
In a dynamic probit model framework and using the German SOEP, Knabe and Plum (2013) 
examine the stepping stone effect of low pay relative to unemployment by including both lagged 
unemployment and lagged low pay as the explanatory variables. They find that low pay can act 
as a stepping stone to better paid employment, particularly for those who do not have a college 
degree, who have been unemployed more often in the past and whose low paid job carries 
relatively high social status. While their model takes into account potential endogeneity of initial 
low pay, initial unemployment is assumed to be exogenous. Given that their estimation results 
show that initial low pay is not in fact exogenous, it is likely that initial unemployment is 
endogenous. Consequently, the estimates of their model are likely to be biased. 
A related theme of research on low pay dynamics examines whether low paid employment and 
unemployment are inter-related. This question arises due to the concern that low paid workers 
may cycle between low pay and unemployment (or non-employment) with little hope of moving 
up the labour market ladder. For example, descriptive analyses tend to show that low paid 
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workers are more likely than higher paid workers to move into joblessness in the future (e.g. 
Stewart and Swaffield, 1999; Cappellari and Jenkins, 2008a, Cappellari and Jenkins, 2008b). Our 
present study examines this issue as wellBut evidence from modelling results is still mixed. 
Cappellari and Jenkins (2008b) find that for the UK men, low pay experience has only a modest 
(and statistically insignificant) effect on the probability of experiencing unemployment in the 
future when individual heterogeneity is accounted for. This result is similar to that found in 
Buddelmeyer et al. (2010) and Cai (2015a) for Australian workers. Uhlendorff (2006) finds that 
for German men, those on low pay have a higher probability of becoming jobless than those on 
higher pay, although the difference is not statistically significant., However, but different from 
Stewart (2007) for Britain who concludes that for the UK men low wage employment has almost 
as large an adverse impact as unemployment on future employment prospects and that low wage 
jobs act as the main conduit for repeated unemployment. Uhlendorff (2006) finds that for 
German men, those on low pay have a higher probability of becoming jobless than those on 
higher pay, although the difference is not statistically significant. For Australia, Fok et al. (2015) 
conclude that low paid employment increases the probability of unemployment relative to higher 
paid employment. As detailed later, this conclusion could be due to incorrect inference. This 
current paper adds further evidence on this issue. 
Besides state dependence, another important aspect of low pay dynamics, which has not drawn 
much research attention in the literature, is duration dependence of low pay. Duration 
dependence addresses the question how duration on low pay affects the probability of exit from 
low pay. Using the BHPS data, Phimister and Theodossiou (2009) present evidence of negative 
duration dependence of low pay for UK workers -  that is, the longer a worker is on low pay, the 
less likely he/she will exit from it. Cai (2015b) shows a similar result for Australian workers 
using the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey. As examining duration 
dependence of low pay requires a different modelling framework (i.e. duration models) from the 
current study, this issue is not analysed further out of the scope here. 
3. The model and estimation strategy 
Econometric model 
The key question in this study is whether, and to what extent, current labour force/earnings 
status, particularly that of low pay, affects future labour force/earnings status. To answer this 
question, we need to model the transitions of the labour force/earnings states - NILF, 
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unemployment, self-employment, low pay and higher pay - over time. Self-employment is 
included as a separate state to address any potential sample selection bias. 
The five labour force/earnings states do not have a natural order from an individual perspective. 
One statistical model that is often used to model labour market outcomes that do not have a 
natural order is the multinomial logit model. Under this modelling framework, at a point of time 
t, an individual i occupies one of the five mutually exclusive labour force/earnings states: NILF, 
unemployment, self-employment, low pay and higher pay (denoted by k =1,2,3,4 and 5). The 
probability of individual i occupying a state k at time t (i.e., Pi,k,t) is assumed to be determined by 
the individual’s previous labour force/earnings status and a vector of other observed and 
unobserved individual characteristics, 
 (1) 𝑃𝑖,𝑘,𝑡(𝜇𝑖,𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1,2,3,4,5) =
exp(𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1𝛼𝑘+𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝛽k+𝜇𝑖,𝑘)
∑ exp(𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1𝛼𝑗+𝑥𝑖,𝑡βj+𝜇𝑖,𝑗)
4
𝑗=1
; 𝑘 = 1,2,3,4,5;  𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇. 
Where 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is a (row) vector of dummy variables indicating labour force/earnings states of 
individual i at time t; 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is a (row) vector of observed characteristics of the individual at time t, 
such as education level, marital status and age; 𝜇𝑖,𝑘 summarizes unobserved individual factors  
that could affect the probability of occupying state k and that do not change over time (i.e., 
unobserved individual heterogeneity); and (𝛼𝑗 , 𝛽𝑗; 𝑗 = 1,2,3,4,5) are the coefficient parameters 
to be estimated. 
The model in equation (1) differs from a conventional multinomial logit model in three aspects. 
First, lagged labour force/earnings status is included as an explanatory variable. The coefficient 
estimates on the lagged dependent variables will allow us to infer the extent of state-dependence 
and stepping stone effects of low paid employment. Second, the model controls for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity (i.e., 𝜇𝑖,𝑗). If unobserved heterogeneity exists, but is not controlled for, 
the estimation results will be biased. This is because the coefficient estimates on the explanatory 
variables, particularly the lagged dependent variables, that are correlated with unobserved 
heterogeneity will be biased. Third, the model allows μi,j and μi,k≠j to be freely correlated with 
each other. This relaxes the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption in the 
conventional multinomial logit model (Greene 2002).1 
The inclusion of unobserved individual heterogeneity in the model, and the fact that the data do 
not provide information on individuals from the beginning of their working life, imply that the 
                                               
1 This IIA assumption states that the odds of any two alternatives do not depend on the inclusion or exclusion of 
other alternatives. In our case, this is equivalent to assuming that the relative probabilities of being unemployed and 
taking a low pay job do not change if NILF is included as an additional choice. This obviously cannot be true.   
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initial labour force/earnings status observed in the data (i.e., 𝐿𝑖,0) is unlikely to be random and 
exogenous. This causes the initial condition problem for the dynamic model as specified in 
equation (1) (Heckman 1981). A solution proposed by Heckman is to separately specify a 
reduced form model for the initial labour force/earnings status and then jointly estimate the 
initial condition model with the dynamic model.  
Alternatively, Wooldridge (2005) suggests modelling the distribution of unobserved individual 
heterogeneity (𝜇𝑖,𝑗) conditional on the initial value of the dependent variable (𝐿𝑖,0) and other 
exogenous explanatory variables. This study adopts the Wooldridge approach since it is easier to 
implement than the Heckman approach. In addition, to relax the assumption in a typical random 
effects model that the observed explanatory variables and unobserved individual heterogeneity 
are independent, we take the Mundlak (1978) approach to specify 2  
(2) 𝜇𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐿𝑖,0𝜆𝑗 + 𝑧?̅?𝜃𝑗 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑗, j=1,2,3,4,5, 
where 𝑧?̅? is a (row) vector containing the means (over time) of the exogenous variables (𝑧𝑖,𝑡). 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 
is typically a subset of the time varying variables in 𝑥𝑖,𝑡. 𝜈𝑖,1, 𝜈𝑖,2, 𝜈𝑖,3 , 𝜈𝑖,4 and 𝜈𝑖,5 represent the 
random effects independent of any observed explanatory variables and are assumed to follow a 
multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and a covariance matrix Σ𝜈. The parameters in 
Σ𝜈 are to be estimated along with all the coefficient parameters in the model Θ =
(𝛼𝑗 , 𝛽𝑗 , 𝜆𝑗 , 𝜃𝑗; 𝑗 = 1,2,3,4,5). 
For model identification purposes, one set of the coefficient parameters and one random effect 
associated with a particular labour force/earnings state choice have to be normalised to zero. We 
normalise the set of the parameters and the random effects associated with NILF to zero.3 
Model estimation strategy 
The probability of observing individual i to take a sequence of labour force/earnings states over 
the time period from t=1 to T, conditional on the random effects (𝜈𝑖,𝑗; 𝑗 = 2,3,4,5) , can be 
written as 
(3)  𝑃𝑖(𝜈𝑖,𝑗 , 𝑗 = 2,3,4,5) = ∏ ∏ [𝑃𝑖,𝑘,𝑡(𝜈𝑖,𝑗 , 𝑗 = 2,3,4,5)]
𝐷𝑖,𝑘,𝑡4
𝑘=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 , 
where 𝐷𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 = 1, if labour force/earnings state k is taken by individual i, and 𝐷𝑖,𝑘 = 0 otherwise. 
                                               
2 In the multinomial logit model framework it is infeasible to estimate a fixed effects model. On the other hand, the 
assumption that unobserved heterogeneity is independent of all observed variables in a random effects model is 
often too strong. The unobserved heterogeneity specified in equation (2) is a compromise between fixed effects and 
random effects models.  
3 That is α1 = β1 =  γ1 = θ1 = λ1 = ν.,1 = 0. 
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The unconditional probability can then be written as, 
(4)  𝐿𝑖 = ∫ 𝑃𝑖(𝜈2,𝜈3, 𝜈4 , 𝜈5 )𝑑𝐺(𝜈2,𝜈3, 𝜈4 , 𝜈5 ) 
where 𝐺(𝜈2,𝜈3, 𝜈4 ,𝜈5 ) is the joint distribution function of the random effects 𝜈2, 𝜈3, 𝜈4  and 𝜈5 . 
The four-dimensional integral is evaluated using simulation methods, with 𝐺(𝜈2,𝜈3, 𝜈4 , 𝜈5 ) 
assumed to be normal with mean zero and a covariance matrix Σ𝜈,  
(5)  𝑃𝑖  ̃ =
1
𝑅
∑ 𝑃𝑖(𝜈2
𝑟, 𝜈3
𝑟 , 𝜈4
𝑟 , 𝜈5
𝑟)𝑅𝑟=1 , 
where R is the number of random draws from the distribution of 𝐺(𝜈2,𝜈3, 𝜈4,𝜈5 ); 𝜈2
𝑟 , 𝜈3
𝑟, 𝜈4
𝑟 and 
𝜈5
𝑟are the rth random draws from their joint distribution. We use a Halton sequence to generate 
50 draws to simulate the likelihood function. It has been shown that Halton sequence draws 
perform much better than simple random draws in terms of approximating the objective function 
(Train 2003). Further, Train (2000) and Bhat (2001) have shown that for mixed logit models, the 
estimation results are more precise with 100 Halton draws than with 1,000 random draws. As a 
compromise between computation time and result accuracy, this study uses 50 Halton sequence 
draws. Haan and Uhlendorff (2006) have shown that for random effects multinominal logit 
models, 50 Halton sequence draws perform well.  
The likelihood function of a sample with N individuals is the product of equation (5) over the 
sample. A Gauss program written by the authors is used to estimate the parameters by 
maximizing the log-likelihood function of the sample. 
Estimation of state-dependence and stepping stone effects 
The non-linear nature of the multinomial logit model makes interpretation of the coefficient 
estimates difficult. Unlike in a linear model, the coefficient estimates from a multinomial logit 
model cannot be interpreted as marginal effects. In particular, state-dependence and stepping 
stone effects of low pay, the focus of this study, cannot be directly inferred by reading the 
coefficient estimates on the lagged dependent variables. This subsection therefore describes how 
state-dependence and stepping stone effects of low pay can be inferred from the estimated 
model.  
As noted earlier, state-dependence refers to the positive effect of being in a state now on the 
probability of being in the same state in the future. Empirically, state-dependence can be 
estimated by the difference between the probability of remaining in a state and the probability of 
transitioning into the state from another state. Given the estimated coefficient parameters of the 
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model Θ̂, state-dependence of low pay, denoted as SD, for an individual i with characteristics 
Ci=(Xi, Zi), conditional on unobserved heterogeneity 𝜈𝑖, can be computed as, 
(6) 𝑆𝐷𝑖(𝜈𝑖) = Pr(𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 4|𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 = 4; Θ̂, 𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝜈𝑖) − Pr(𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 4|𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑘; Θ̂, 𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝜈𝑖),  
for k=1, 2, 3, 5. This is the difference between the probability of remaining in low pay and the 
probability of transitioning into low pay from another labour force/earnings state.  
In the earlier studies that define low pay as a binary dependent variable, state-dependence of low 
pay is estimated as the difference between the probability of remaining in low pay and the 
probability of transitioning into low pay from higher pay. In our multiple-state modelling 
framework, the estimate of state-dependence of low pay is not unique – it varies depending on 
the comparative labour force/earnings state, as shown in equation (6).  
Following the same strategy of estimating the model, the conditioning on unobserved 
heterogeneity can be integrated out through simulation by repeatedly drawing from the estimated 
distribution of 𝜈𝑖 to estimate unconditional state-dependence of low pay as 𝑆𝐷𝑖 =
1
𝑅
∑ 𝑆𝐷𝑖(𝜈𝑖
𝑟)𝑅𝑟=1 . 
As discussed earlier, stepping stone effects of low pay refer to the higher probability of 
transitioning into higher pay from low pay than from non-employment. Therefore, the stepping 
stone effect of low pay can be estimated by the difference between the probability of 
transitioning into higher pay from low pay and the probability of transitioning into higher pay 
from unemployment or from NILF. For an individual i with characteristics Ci=(Xi, Zi), 
conditional on unobserved heterogeneity 𝜈𝑖, the stepping stone effect can be computed as, 
(7) 𝑆𝑆𝑖(𝜈𝑖) = Pr(𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 5|𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 = 4; Θ̂, 𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝜈𝑖) − Pr(𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 5|𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑘; Θ̂, 𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝜈𝑖),  
where k=0 or 1. Unobserved heterogeneity is integrated out in the same way as in estimating 
state-dependence of low pay, so that 𝑆𝑆𝑖 =
1
𝑅
∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑖(𝜈𝑖
𝑟)𝑅𝑟=1 . 
In the results section, the sample means of the estimated state-dependence and stepping stone 
effects are reported. That is, 𝑆𝐷 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝐷𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ; and 𝑆𝑆 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 . 
9 
 
4. Data and model specification 
Data source and low pay definition 
This paper uses data from the 18 waves of the BHPS, covering years 1991 to 2008.4 Taylor 
(1996) documents details of this survey. In the first wave around 5,500 households and 10,300 
individuals were drawn from 250 areas of Great Britain. Subsequent interviews for later waves 
were conducted about one year apart. In 1999 additional household samples (1,500 each) from 
Scotland and Wales were added; and in 2001 a sample of 2,000 household in Northern Ireland 
was added to make the survey suitable for UK-wide research. While tThe additional samples, 
from Scotland and Wales  together with individuals who joined the households in the survey 
sample through marriage, are included in the analysis, those from Northern Ireland are not. 
The BHPS contains detailed information on individual characteristics, labour market outcomes 
and activity. Information on labour force status and earnings is used to define the dependent 
variable, labour force/earnings status (i.e., NILF, unemployment, self-employment, low pay and 
higher pay). Classification of people into NILF and unemployment follows the conventional 
approach in labour economics: a person is unemployed if he or she does not have a job, but had 
looked for work in the past four weeks and is available for work; and those who are not 
employed and not actively seeking  a job are classified as NILF.  
However, there is not a consensus on how to define low pay (and consequently its counterpart, 
higher pay). First, there is the issue whether monthly earnings or hourly earnings should be used 
to define low pay. The BHPS provides information on monthly earnings. However, using 
monthly earnings to define low pay is problematic for those who work part-time – they are likely 
to be classified as on low pay, simply because they work fewer hours and the low hours worked 
are out of their own choice. To avoid this problem, in this study hourly earnings are used to 
define low pay status and hourly earnings are derived by using monthly earnings and weekly 
hours worked.5  
Another issue in defining low pay is where to set the low pay threshold, the hourly earnings level 
below which workers can be classified as on low pay. Different thresholds have been used in the 
literature. This study uses two thirds of the median hourly earnings, which appears to be the most 
                                               
4 After wave 18 BHPS respondents were absorbed into the expanded Understanding Society longitudinal data-set 
and the new data cover the period of the Great Recession. Thus, by ending the analysis in 2008 we avoid these 
complications. For an analysis of state dependence of unemployment covering the later period, but using random 
effects probit see Tumino (2015). 
5 Both monthly earnings and hours worked include overtime. 
Commented [SP2]: Scotland and Wales, but not Northern 
Ireland are included? 
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popular definition for low pay (Cappellari and Jenkins 2008; Buddelmeyer et al. 2010). This low 
pay threshold is defined separately for each wave using hourly earnings of employees aged 18 
year and over and is shown in Table 1, together with the proportion of employees classified to be 
low paid based on this threshold. The table also shows hourly national minimum wages for adult 
employees (NMW) from 1999 when the NMW was first introduced. The two-thirds median 
earnings low pay threshold is about 12 to 30 per cent higher than the NMW for the relevant 
years.  
The sample used in this study includes individuals aged between 18 and 64 years (inclusive) for 
males and 18 and 60 (inclusive) for females. As hinted at earlier, self-employed persons are 
included in the sample, but following convention, full-time students in the age range are 
excluded. Observations with missing dependent and independent variables are also excluded for 
a self-explanatory reason. The first wave when an individual entered the BHPS is used to define 
the initial labour force/earnings status and thus excluded from the sample for model estimation. 
Since panel data models require at least two observations for each individual for identification 
purposes, those individuals with only one observation are excluded from the sample.  
It is well established in the literature that males and females behave differently in the labour 
market. This study therefore models males and females separately. The male sample has 
64,310939 observations, representing 9,04873 individuals; the female sample has 71,03535 
observations, representing 9,6709 individuals.6 Summary statistics of the sample are presented in 
Appendix Table A1. Relatively to higher paid workers, low paid workers tend to be young, low 
educated, and have a disability. 
The sample is an unbalanced panel and naturally there would be a concern over the potential 
impact of panel attrition on the estimation results. In a similar modelling framework to the 
                                               
6 There are 238,966 observations from the 18 wave responding person data files. The 135,345 observations used in 
this study are reached after the following exclusions: 1,536 are excluded due to missing values of the region variable 
or living in Channel Islands; 5,780 observations are excluded because they were individuals who appeared in only 
one wave of the survey; the age restrictions exclude 57,192 observations; 8,335 observations are dropped because of 
missing values of the dependent variable; 10,807 observations are dropped due to missing values of explanatory 
variables (mostly missing education); 20,001 observations are dropped since they are the first waves of the included 
individuals; 30 observations are dropped due to missing values in the estimated probability of remaining in the 
survey, which is used for testing panel attrition bias.  
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current study Uhlendorff (2006) shows that panel attrition can be treated as exogenous with 
respect to low pay and non-employment dynamics of German workers. In addition, Cappellari 
and Jenkins (2008) show that panel attrition is not a concern in modelling low pay transitions of 
the UK workers using the BHPS, where low pay is defined as a binary variable. But they used a 
shorter panel of the BHPS than we do in this current study. Attrition becomes more of an issue 
the longer a panel survey lasts. We test and discuss attrition bias in Section 6. 
To  examine further the potential impact of ignoring panel attrition on the results, we 
experimented by estimating a model that took the variable-addition approach to testing attrition 
bias, by including a variable that indicates whether attrition has occurred in the following wave 
as an additional explanatory variable. Such an approach was initially suggested by Verbeek and 
Nijman (1992) and recently applied to the HILDA data in Wooden and Li (2014).  The last non-
attrition wave available (i.e., wave 18 in our case) is lost in estimating such a model since for the 
last non-attrition wave the attrition indicator is not defined. The coefficient estimates show that 
for males none of the four coefficients on the attrition indicator in the four equations is 
statistically significant; for females only the coefficients on the attrition indicator in the 
unemployment and self-employment equations are significant. However, in terms of the 
estimates on state-dependence and stepping stone effects of low pay, the results are very similar 
between the two models with and without the attrition indicator (see Appendix Table A3).  
Table 2 presents the year-on-year transitions of labour force/earning status by pooling all the 
waves (i.e. including wave 1). There is some indication of a stepping stone effect of low pay 
relative to either unemployment, NILF or self-employment, since for both males and females, 
those who are on low pay have a higher probability of transitioning into higher pay in the 
following year than those who are either unemployed, NILF or self-employed. On the other 
hand, there is also an indication of state-dependence of low pay since the table shows that those 
who are on low pay tend to have a higher probability of being in low pay in the following year 
than those who are not on low pay.  
However, we should not draw inferences on the stepping stone effect and/or state-dependence of 
low pay from this simple cross-tabulation, since these results may be driven by observed and/or 
unobserved differences in individual characteristics. For example, the summary statistics show 
that those who are on low pay are less likely to have a disability than those who are unemployed 
or NILF, and this may explain why those on low pay are more likely to move to higher pay than 
those who are not employed. In addition, it is also likely that those who are on low pay have 
better unobserved skills (e.g., ability) than those who are not employed and therefore are more 
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likely to move to higher pay in the future. The model described earlier controls for the 
differences in both observed and unobserved individual characteristics and thus allows for more 
accurate inferences regarding the stepping stone effect and state-dependence of low pay 
employment. 
Model specification 
As discussed earlier, (one year) lagged labour force/earnings states are included in the model as 
explanatory variables to estimate the stepping stone effect and state-dependence of low pay 
employment. Labour force/earnings states at the time when they first entered the BHPS are also 
included to address the initial condition problem. 
In addition to the lagged and initial labour force/earnings status variables, the following 
explanatory variables are included as control variables in the model: education (six dummies 
indicating the highest education qualification obtained, including first degree or higher, other 
higher degrees, A-level(s), O-level(s), other qualification, and no qualification); age (five age 
category dummies); marital status (one dummy indicating whether a person is married or 
partnered); disability (one dummy indicating whether health limits work); age of the youngest 
child (six dummies indicating no dependent children under 19, youngest child aged 0-2, 
youngest child aged 3-4, youngest child aged 5-11, youngest child aged 12-18, and youngest 
child aged 17-18 ); the total number of children aged under 19 years; region of residence (two 
dummies representing living in London or South East), and regional unemployment rates.7 
Furthermore, wave dummies are included to control for the effect of time; they may also capture 
the impacts of macroeconomic conditions and policy settings on labour force/earnings status. For 
the mean variables to account for correlated random effects, the means of the time-varying 
variables marital status, disability status and the number of children are included in the model. 
5. Estimation results 
The main results are shown in panel (b) of Table 3. To facilitate discussion of the results, the 
mean predicted transition probabilities of the sample are presented in panel (a) of Table 3. The 
coefficient estimates of the models can be found in Appendix Table A2. 
                                               
7 We experimented using the employment to population ratio as an alternative measure of regional labour market 
conditions. This is perhaps a better measure of labour demand than the unemployment rate, but the estimates on all 
other variables are virtually the samevery similar.  
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Stepping stone effects 
The estimates for the stepping stone effects are shown in column V of panel (b) in Table 3. As 
discussed earlier, they are the differences between the probability of transitioning into higher pay 
from low pay and the probability of transitioning into higher pay from unemployment and NILF. 
The estimates indicate a statistically significant stepping stone effect of low paid employment for 
both males and females. For males, compared with those who are out of the labour force, those 
who are on low pay have an 112 percentage point higher probability of transitioning into higher 
pay in the following year. The stepping stone effect of low pay relative to unemployment is 
similar to that relative to NILF. The stepping stone effects of low pay for females appear to be 
lower than that for males. For females, the stepping stone effect of low pay relative to NILF is 
about 9 percentage points, slightly higher than the effect relative to unemployment (at 87.65 
percentage points), but the difference is not statistically significant.  
For German men, Uhlendorff (2006) estimates that those on low pay have a 5 to 6 percentage 
point higher probability of transitioning into higher pay in the following year compared with 
those who are not employed. Therefore, the stepping stone effects of low pay for UK workers 
appear to be larger than that for German workers.  
In their main modelling results Fok et al. (2015) find that the stepping stone effects of low pay 
relative to unemployment in Australia is 4.4 percentage points for males and 11.3 percentage 
points for females. So the effect is smaller for males but larger for females in Fok et al. (2015) 
for Australia than in this current study for British employees.    
Interestingly the results show that for both males and females, those on lay paid employment 
have a higher chance moving to a higher paid job than the self-employed if the latter were to 
become  employees. This may suggest that the work experience of the self-employed may not be 
valued as much as that of an employee, even if she or he is low paid.  
State-dependence 
The estimates for state-dependence of low pay are shown in column IV of panel (b) in Table 3. 
The results show that relative to other labour force/earnings states, those who are on low pay 
have a higher probability of being on low pay in the following year, an indication of state-
dependence of low paid employment. For example, men who are on low pay have an 11 (or 9) 
percentage point higher probability of being on low pay in the following year, compared to men 
who are out of the labour force (or unemployed).  
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Most previous studies infer state-dependence of low pay as compared to higher pay and focus on 
men. The results here show that, compared to men who are on higher pay, state-dependence of 
low pay is found to be just over 123 percentage points. This estimate is similar to that found in 
Clarke and Kanellopoulos (2009) for UK men (14 percentage points) and comparable to that 
found in Stewart and Swaffield (1999), which ranges from 14 to 25 percentage points depending 
on the models and definitions of low pay.  
However, the state-dependence estimates for low paid employment as compared to NILF and 
unemployment need to be interpreted with caution. This is because for those who are NILF or 
unemployed, their lower probability of transitioning into low pay relative to those who are on 
low pay is not because the former have a better chance of transitioning into higher pay than the 
latter, rather it is because the former have a higher probability of remaining not employed than 
the latter. For example, the estimates in columns I and II of panel (b) in Table 3 indicate that for 
males, compared with those who are out of the labour force, those who are on low pay have a 18 
percentage point lower probability of moving out of the labour force, and a 5 percentage point 
lower probability of becoming unemployed in the following year. Compared with those who are 
unemployed, those who are on low pay have a 98 percentage point lower probability of moving 
out of the labour force, and a 101 percentage point lower probability of becoming unemployed in 
the following year.  
As a result, those who are on low pay have a higher probability of remaining employed in the 
following year than those who are either unemployed or NILF.  If, from a society’s perspective, 
employment, even low paid, is a more desirable outcome than non-employment (e.g., due to 
lower welfare spending and higher tax revenue), low pay employment is preferable to non-
employment for its impact on future employment.   
Does low pay lead to joblessness? 
As discussed earlier, empirical evidence on the low pay – no pay cycle has so far been mixed in 
the literature. Low pay-no pay cycle implies that low paid employees are more likely to move 
into jobless (either unemployment or NILF) than higher pay employees. What can we learn from 
our estimates on this issue if we take NILF and unemployment as no-pay states? Column II of 
panel (b) in Table 3 shows the difference between the probability of transitioning to 
unemployment from low pay and the probability of transitioning to unemployment from other 
labour force/earnings states. The results indicate that those who are on low pay have a slightly 
higher probability of transitioning to unemployment than those who are on higher pay for both 
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males and females. However, these transition probability differences are very small in magnitude 
(i.e., around 0.4 and 0.2 percentage points for males and females respectively) and statistically 
insignificant, indicating that those who are on low pay are roughly equally likely to transition 
into unemployment as those who are on higher pay, a result consistent with that of Buddelmeyer 
et al. (2010) and Cai (2015a) for Australians. Furthermore, the results in column I of panel (b) in 
Table 3 indicate that for males, those who are on low pay are slightly more or less equally likely 
to transition into NILF asthan those who are on higher pay, but again this difference is not 
statistically significant. ; while On the other hand, Ffemales on low pay are less likely to 
transition into NILF than females on higher pay butand the difference is not statistically 
significant either. Therefore, overall the results here do not appear to support a low pay – no pay 
cycle after observed and unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for.  
The finding that low paid workers do not have a higher probability of becoming unemployed or 
moving out of the labour force than higher paid workers does not support the notion that 
employers may take low paid employment as a signal of low productivity. On the contrary, this 
result, combined with the evidence on the stepping stone effects of low pay, suggests that low 
paid employment helps job seekers build up skills to improve their employment prospects and 
opportunities in the labour market.     
How do we reconcile ourthis result here with those in Fok et al. (2015), which concludes that 
low paid workers are more likely to move into unemployment in Australia? First, this study is for 
Britain and the labour market institutions are different between Britain and Australia, so that we 
should not necessarily expect a similar result for the two countries. Second, Fok et al. (2015) do 
not include people who are out of labour force and not marginally attached to the labour market 
in the sample, let alone the self-employed. This is likely to result in sample selection bias in the 
estimates. Third, while this study employs a commonly used low pay threshold of two-thirds of 
median hourly earnings, Fok et al. (2015) use a low pay definition based on Australia’s national 
minimum wage. Fourth, the inference on the low pay – no pay cycle in Fok et al. (2015) is based 
on the significance of the coefficient estimates. In a non-linear model like the multinominal logit 
model, a significant coefficient does not mean the marginal effect estimate is significant as well. 
Indeed the magnitude of their marginal estimates is small and they do not provide standard errors 
for the marginal effect estimates. So we cannot infer whether the marginal effect estimates are 
statistically significant. Further, it is not clear how they have dealt with unobserved 
heterogeneity when calculating the marginal effects. It is likely they have just assumed it to be 
zero – but it is not stated anywhere in their paper. Again, since this is a non-linear model and the 
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marginal effects are affected by unobserved heterogeneity, their results may depend on the 
particular way they deal with unobserved heterogeneity. 
Using also the BHPS, but with a much shorter panel, Stewart (2007) concludes that low-wage 
employment in the previous year has almost as large an adverse effect as unemployment in the 
previous on the probability of employment of the current year for the UK men. It turns out that 
this conclusion is based on the result that the estimate for the one-year lagged low pay dummy is 
not statistically significantly different from the estimate for the one-year lagged unemployment 
dummy in his dynamic Probit model where current unemployment status is the dependent 
variable. However, the partial effect estimates indicate that those who were in low-wage 
employment in the previous year have only a 1.5 to 2 percentage point higher probability of 
moving into unemployment this year than those in higher-wage employment in the previous 
year, depending on whether continuing spells are included or not. In contrast, the probability of 
being unemployed in this year conditional on being unemployed in the previous year is 3.5 to 15 
percentage point higher than the probability of moving into unemployment in this year of those 
in higher wage employment in the previous year. In addition to a different modelling framework, 
Stewartd (2007) includes only labour force participants in his sample; so sample selection bias 
may potentially be present in his study. 
The period of analysis is also relevant. In the UK a welfare-to-work programme, with the stated 
purpose of reducing unemployment by providing training, subsidised employment and voluntary 
work for the unemployed, was introduced by the new Labour government in 1998. Separate 
elements were the New Deal for Young People, New Deal 25 plus, New Deal for Lone Parents, 
New Deal for the Disabled and New Deal 50 plus.  There was also the power to withdraw 
benefits for those who refused offers of reasonable employment. Thus,Stafford et al. (2007) 
report that there was a concerted drive to get the disabled off disability benefits. Over the period 
July 2001 to November 2006 over 260,000 disabled persons registered under the scheme and of 
these 43% had found jobs by November 2006..Blundell et al. (2016) examined the case of lone 
mothers for whom major increases in in-work benefits or tax credits occurred between 1999 and 
2002.They find that the employment rates for secondary and high school educated lone mothers 
increased by between 4 and 5.5 % points above the employment rates of similar single women 
without children. Following the introduction of the New Deals UK unemployment overall fell 
from 6.3% to 5.2% between Spring 1998 and Winter 2000.It seems plausible, therefore, that the  
introduction of these policies could explain why we do not find evidence of a low-pay-no pay 
cycle in our study, since the studies that do find evidence in favour cover in the main a period 
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before such policies were introduced, while a substantial part  of our period analysed is affected 
by such changes. 
Low pay and self-employment 
Earlier studies have rarely examined the relationship between low pay and self-employment, 
although a substantial proportion of workers are self-employed as shown in Table 1. The model 
in this study provides an opportunity to look at this issue.  
Interestingly the results show that for both males and females, those on loway paid employment 
have a higher chance (25 and 12 percentage points for males and females respectively) of 
moving to a higher paid job than the self-employed if the latter were to become employees. This 
may suggest that the work experience of the self-employed may not be valued as much as that of 
an employee, even if she or he is low paid. 
The results also show that those ion low paid employment have a lower chance of moving out of 
the labour force than those who are self-employed, although the chance of moving into 
unemployment is not statistically significantly different between low paid employees and self-
employed workers.  Furthermore, for males self-employment appears to be stickier (i.e. less 
likely to move out of the state) than low paid employment, while for females the opposite 
appears to hold. 
Heterogeneity in state-dependence and stepping stone effects 
To examine heterogeneity in state-dependence and stepping effects of low paid employment, we 
split each gender sample by age and level of education and estimated the model separately for 
each of the sub-samples. ForAlong age we estimated the model separately for those under 45 
years and those 45 years and over. ForAlong education levels we estimated the model for the 
following three groups: (a) those with a degree or higher qualification, (b) those with a non-
degree qualification (i.e. A-level, O-level and other qualifications), and (c) those without 
qualification.  
The results by age are presented in Table 4. For both males and females, the stepping stone 
effects of low pay relative to both NILF and unemployment appear to be much larger among 
those aged 45 years and over than among the younger ones. While state-dependence of low pay 
seems to be smaller among the older group than among the young one for males, the opposite 
appears to hold for females, but the differences in state-dependence of low pay between the older 
and the young groups do not appear to be statistically significant.  
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The results Bby education level are presented in Table 5., fFor males the stepping stone effect 
(state-dependence) of low pay appears to be larger (smaller) among degree holders and those 
without a qualification than among those with a non-degree qualification. For females the 
stepping stone effect of low pay is largest among those without a qualification, followed by those 
with a non-degree qualification, and smallest among those degree holders. While state-
dependence of low pay relative to NILF and unemployment for females is largest among those 
without a qualification, followed by those with a non-degree qualification, and smallest among 
those degree holders, state-dependence of low pay relative to higher pay for females is larger 
among those without a qualification than among those degree holders and those with a non-
degree qualification.  
The impacts of the NMWs on low pay dynamics 
The British Government introduced the NMW in April 1999. A large volume of research has 
been devoted to assess the impacts of the NMW on various labour market outcomes, but there 
does not seem to have been any research on the impacts of the NMW on low pay dynamics.8 We 
examine this issue by estimating the model separately for the periods before (1991-98) and after 
(1999-2008) the introduction of the NMW to see whether state dependence and stepping stone 
effects of low pay have changed between the two periods. Since the NMW only applied to adult 
employees aged 22 years and above, we excluded those aged under 22 year from the sample for 
the analysis in this section. 
It is not straightforward to expect a priori how the introduction of the NMW affects state-
dependence and stepping stone effects of low pay between the two periods. On one hand, the 
introduction of the NMW might mean the average skill level of low paid workers becomes 
higher if NMWs price the lowest skilled workers out of employment. This may in turn means 
that the introduction of the NMW reduces state-dependence but increases the stepping stone 
effects of low paid employment. On the other hand, if the NMWs are set at a relatively low level 
and have therefore little impact on employment, then the introduction of the NMW should not 
have much an impact on low pay dynamics.    
The empirical results are shown in Table 654. For both males and females the stepping stone 
effects of low pay, relative to both NILF and unemployment, appear to be larger in the first 
                                               
8 See, for example, Machin et al. (2003), Stewart (2004), and Dickens, Riley and Wilkinson (2015) on the impacts 
of NMWs on employment rates; and Stewart and Swaffield (2008) on the impacts of NMWs on hours worked. 
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period than in the second one, particularly for males, but the differences between the two periods 
are not statistically significant. On the other hand, sState-dependence of low pay relative to other 
labour market states does not appears to be larger in the second than in the first period for both 
genders, but again the differences are statistically significantly different insignificant between 
the two periods either. Therefore, overall the introduction of the NMW does not seem to have 
affected the dynamics of low paid employment in terms of its state-dependence and stepping 
stone effects. 
The Great Recession and low pay dynamics 
It would be useful to know how state-dependence and stepping stone effects of low pay vary 
with macroeconomic conditions, in particular whether and to what extent the Great Recession 
changed these effects. However, the BHPS does not allow such an issue to be examined using 
the same data source since the BHPS stopped in 2008 when the Great Recession started. Instead, 
we use the first five wave Understanding Society data to re-estimate the model and calculate the 
estimated transition probabilities and state-dependence and stepping stone effects.9 
The results are presented in Table 7. These results are compared with the estimates from waves 9 
to 18 of the BHPS since this period was just before the Great Recession. Comparing the results, 
we can see that for both males and females the stepping stone effects of low pay are smaller 
during the Great Recession than in the earlier period, and this is mainly due to that the 
probability of transitioning to higher pay from low pay is much smaller during recession than in 
the earlier period, particularly for males. 
As for state-dependence of low pay, it appears to be smaller during the Great Recession than in 
the earlier period for both males and females ,when low pay is compared with either NILF or 
unemployment. However, compared with higher pay, for males state-dependence of low pay is 
similar between the two periods, while for females it is slightly smaller during the Great 
Recession. These results are not because the probability of remaining in low pay becomes much 
smaller during the Great Recession; rather, it is because the probability of transitioning to low 
pay from higher pay has increased from the second period of the BHPS to the Great Recession.     
                                               
9 We use the entire Understanding Society sample rather than the BHPS sample in the Understanding Society 
because the BHPS sample were not invited to join the Understanding Society until wave 2  and less than 6,700  of 
the over 8000 BHPS sample invited to join did so. 
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6. Attrition bias 
To test for attrition bias, we use the simple variable-addition tests as suggested by Verbeek and 
Nijman (1992). We use the following test variables: (a) an indicator ofn whether attrition 
occurred in the following wave (attrition indicator); (b) a variable on the proportion of time an 
individual responded to the survey since he/she first entered the survey; number of waves that 
the individual is observed in the survey (prop time respondingnumber of waves); and (c) an 
indicator on whether the individual is in the survey all the timebalanced sample (balanceall time 
indicator).10 The estimates for these variables are presented in Table 86. From the table there is 
evidence of attrition bias as about half of these variables are statistically significant. Nonetheless, 
the coefficient estimates of these variable-addition models are very similar to those of the main 
model. As a result, the simulated transition matrices and the estimates on state-dependence and 
stepping stone effects of low pay are very similar as well.11  
The variable-addition models are for testing the presence of potential attrition bias rather than for 
correcting the bias. To further investigate attribution bias, we adopt an inverse probability 
weighted estimator proposed by Wooldridge (2002b,c) and recently applied in Contoyannis, 
Jones, and Rice (2004) and Clark and Kanellopoulos (2013). However,It should be noted that 
such an estimator can only be applied to a pooled model that does not account for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity (Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice, 2004). In our case it is equivalent to 
estimating a multinomial logit model using the pooled data and the log-likelihood function of 
each observation is weighted by the inverse of an estimated probability of responding to the 
survey in each wave. The estimates from the weighted model are compared with the estimates 
from an unweighted model also applied to the pooled data to assess attrition bias.  
This comparison does not provide a precise measure of attrition bias for the main model that 
                                               
10 The test variables (b) and (c) are a variation to what Verbeek and Nijman (1992) propose to reflect the fact that 
some individuals entered the survey later (i.e. after the first wave in 1991), as discussed in Section 4. The variable 
(b) is equivalent to the variable on the total number of waves an individual responded to the survey that is proposed 
by Verbeek and Nijman (1992); and the variable (c) is equivalent to the variable indicating if an individual is in the 
balanced  panel that is proposed by Verbeek and Nijman (1992). The basic rationale for Verbeek and Nijman (1992) 
to propose the two variables is that they are a function of the indicator whether an individual responds to the survey 
in each wave.  The two equivalent variables (b) and (c) in this study meet this requirement as well.   
11 These results are not presented in the paper, but can be obtained from authors on request. 
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accounts for unobserved individual heterogeneity, but it can be regarded as an upper bound 
estimate of the bias. This is because attrition bias in the main model should not be larger than in 
the pooled model since the main model may correct for attrition bias to some extent if attrition is 
affected by unobserved heterogeneity as well. 
To obtain the probability of responding to the survey, we estimate Probit equations for 
responding to the survey versus attrition for each wave from the second wave conditional on a 
set of variables measured at the first wave. The set of variables includes those used in the main 
model as well as additional variables on general health of an individual and the total number of 
calls to the household for the survey. These additional variables are expected to predict attrition. 
Inconsistent withDespite the evidence from the variable-addition models in Table 8, the inverse 
probability weighted estimator does not shows little evidence of attrition bias. The coefficient 
estimates are very similar between the weighted and unweighted models, as shown in the 
appendix Table A3xx. A Hausman test cannot reject the hypothesis that the two sets of 
coefficient estimates are equal.12 Importantly the simulated transition probabilities and estimated 
state-dependence and stepping stone effects of low pay are very similar as well between the two 
models, as shown in (see Table 9Axx in the appendix). Therefore, the overall evidence suggests 
that attrition bias is not a serious issue even if it may be present. 
 
6.7.Conclusions 
Using the 18 wave BHPS survey, this study examined whether and to what extent low pay is 
genuinely persistent (i.e., state-dependence of low pay), and whether and to what extent low pay 
leads to higher pay (i.e., stepping stone effects of low pay). To this end, a dynamic random 
effects multinomial logit model was estimated separately for males and females in Britain to 
account for observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity, and state-dependence and 
stepping stone effects of low pay were then computed from the estimated models. 
The results show that both state-dependence and stepping stone effects of low pay are present 
after observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity is accounted for. That is, other things 
being equal, those employees who are on low pay are more likely to be found on low pay in the 
future, compared with those who are not in the labour force, unemployed or on higher pay. 
However, it is also the case that, other things being equal, those who are on low pay are more 
                                               
12 The test statistics χ2= 124.21for males; χ2= 116.44 for females, both with degree of freedom 192. 
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likely to move into higher pay in the future than those who are either not in the labour force or 
unemployed.  
There is also evidence that there is heterogeneity in the stepping stone effects of low pay. The 
effects tend to be larger for old people than the younger ones. aAnd the effects appear to be 
larger for those with a non-degree qualification than among degree holders and those without a 
qualification.  
While there is evidence on state-dependence of low paid employment, people who are on low 
pay are found to be more likely to be in employment in the future than those who are either 
unemployed or not in the labour force. In addition, those who are on low pay do not appear to be 
more likely to move out of employment than those who are on higher pay. These results suggest 
that there is not a low pay – no pay cycle among British workers, once observed and unobserved 
individual heterogeneity is accounted for.  
The findings that low pay acts as a stepping stone to higher pay and does not lead to non-
employment provide supportive evidence for the work-first approach in welfare reforms and also 
suggest that minimum wages should be set at an appropriate level that promotes employment, 
even if the jobs created are low paid. This in turn suggests that the new Living Wage being 
introduced by the British Government at a level above the minimum wage may be unhelpful if it 
leads to a loss of employment for marginal groups of workers.  
Consistent with many other studies that find the introduction the national minimum wage has 
little impact on employment, this study finds the introduction of the national minimum wage has 
little impact on state-dependence and stepping stone effects of low pay.  
It would be interesting to see how the dynamics of low pay varied during the Great Financial 
Crisis (GFC). However, the data used for this study do not cover the period. Future research 
could examine this issue by combining different data sources such as the BHPS and the 
Understanding Society. Another limitation of the current study is that the modelling framework 
could not examine the effects of job characteristics on the dynamics of low pay because 
information on these variables is missing for those who are not employed. This issue may be 
picked up in future research using a different modelling framework.   
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 Table 1: low pay thresholds and proportions of low paid employees 
Year 
Low pay 
thresholds 
(£) 
  % of employees aged 18 plus low paid 
NMW 
(£) Males Females All employees 
1991 3.28 
 
11.43 30.13 20.45 
1992 3.54 
 
11.28 29.56 20.32 
1993 3.57 
 
12.69 29.87 21.20 
1994 3.74 
 
13.67 30.72 22.25 
1995 3.85 
 
13.82 29.71 21.71 
1996 4.04 
 
14.87 31.75 23.34 
1997 4.14 
 
13.22 28.77 20.89 
1998 4.33 
 
12.83 28.62 20.57 
1999 4.55 3.60 13.11 28.55 20.77 
2000 4.83 3.70 13.64 28.84 21.04 
2001 5.08 4.10 13.54 29.77 21.61 
2002 5.26 4.20 12.80 29.82 21.20 
2003 5.39 4.50 14.30 25.97 20.04 
2004 5.59 4.85 12.80 26.58 19.69 
2005 5.86 5.05 15.57 26.17 20.83 
2006 6.08 5.35 15.17 25.92 20.54 
2007 6.26 5.52 13.46 26.53 20.10 
2008 6.42 5.73 14.64 25.55 22.10 
 
 
Table 2: Year-on-year transitions of labour force/earnings status (row percentage) 
Labour 
force/earnings 
status at t-1 
Labour force/earnings status at t 
Number of 
observations 
Not in 
labour force 
Unemploy-
ment 
Self-
employment 
Low 
pay 
Higher 
pay 
 
Males 
     Not in labour 
force 87.56 5.39 1.85 1.95 3.25 6,606 
Unemployment 14.96 48.38 6.02 12.07 18.57 3,704 
Self-employment 1.98 1.89 84.92 4.75 6.46 8,899 
Low pay 2.56 5.79 7.52 43.79 40.33 5,889 
Higher pay 1.58 1.85 1.93 4.29 90.35 37,571 
All 11.58 5.35 14.47 8.28 60.32 62,669 
 
Females 
     Not in labour 
force 81.69 3.19 1.51 6.78 6.82 17,940 
Unemployment 35.84 27.65 2.14 17.14 17.23 2,246 
Self-employment 8.08 1.63 74.27 8.48 7.53 3,253 
Low pay 8.58 2.68 2.56 59.99 26.19 13,155 
Higher pay 4.97 1.17 0.85 7.88 85.13 32,703 
All 26.66 2.86 4.83 17.82 47.82 69,297 
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Table 3: Model estimated transition probabilities, state-dependence and stepping stone 
effects 
    Males         
  
(a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, 
  
      conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1   
  
Labour/earnings state, t 
 
Labour/earnings  
state, t-1 NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay Higher pay 
(1) NILF 0.2492 0.0999 0.1279 0.0865 0.4365 
 
s.e. 0.021 0.035 0.036 0.020 0.041 
(2) Unemploy 0.161 0.155 0.134 0.110 0.440 
 
s.e. 0.016 0.050 0.035 0.026 0.045 
(3) Self-employ 0.098 0.063 0.396 0.141 0.303 
 
s.e. 0.014 0.036 0.072 0.029 0.056 
(4) Low pay 0.073 0.052 0.123 0.196 0.556 
 
s.e. 0.009 0.036 0.033 0.039 0.052 
(5) Higher pay 0.067 0.048 0.058 0.071 0.756 
 
s.e. 0.007 0.026 0.027 0.017 0.040 
  
(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities 
  
      (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
  
I II III IV V 
(6) =(4)-(1) -0.177 -0.048 -0.005 0.109 0.119 
 
s.e. 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.020 0.022 
(7) =(4)-(2) -0.088 -0.103 -0.011 0.085 0.116 
 
s.e. 0.012 0.050 0.014 0.021 0.036 
(8) =(4)-(3) -0.026 -0.010 -0.273 0.055 0.253 
 
s.e. 0.007 0.019 0.045 0.026 0.028 
(9) =(4)-(5) 0.006 0.004 0.066 0.125 -0.200 
  s.e. 0.004 0.017 0.011 0.023 0.022 
       
  
Females 
    
  
(a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, 
  
      conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1 
 
  
Labour/earnings state, t 
 
Labour/earnings  
state, t-1 NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay Higher pay 
(1) NILF 0.431 0.046 0.040 0.147 0.337 
 
s.e. 0.024 0.020 0.011 0.026 0.022 
(2) Unemploy 0.340 0.105 0.038 0.174 0.343 
 
s.e. 0.026 0.046 0.016 0.028 0.026 
(3) Self-employ 0.244 0.045 0.184 0.223 0.304 
 
s.e. 0.027 0.038 0.043 0.040 0.032 
(4) Low pay 0.167 0.028 0.044 0.333 0.428 
 
s.e. 0.017 0.019 0.014 0.046 0.034 
(5) Higher pay 0.181 0.027 0.023 0.151 0.619 
 
s.e. 0.015 0.016 0.009 0.032 0.034 
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(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities 
  
      (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
  
I II III IV V 
(6) =(4)-(1) -0.264 -0.017 0.004 0.186 0.091 
 
s.e. 0.011 0.005 0.008 0.022 0.018 
(7) =(4)-(2) -0.172 -0.077 0.006 0.159 0.085 
 
s.e. 0.016 0.030 0.009 0.031 0.021 
(8) =(4)-(3) -0.077 -0.017 -0.141 0.111 0.124 
 
s.e. 0.018 0.021 0.040 0.024 0.024 
(9) =(4)-(5) -0.013 0.002 0.021 0.182 -0.191 
  s.e. 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.020 0.018 
  
 Table 4: Estimation by age 
 
  Males Aged 18-44 years         Aged 45 plus       
  
(a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1 
 
  Labour/earnings state, t 
 
Labour/earnings  
state, t-1 NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
 
NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
(1) NILF 0.110 0.114 0.122 0.105 0.550 
 
0.437 0.073 0.128 0.066 0.296 
 
s.e. 0.018 0.063 0.047 0.032 0.063 
 
0.046 0.068 0.071 0.023 0.048 
(2) Unemploy 0.056 0.152 0.119 0.125 0.549 
 
0.318 0.180 0.148 0.080 0.275 
 
s.e. 0.014 0.098 0.044 0.047 0.070 
 
0.045 0.107 0.072 0.031 0.059 
(3) Self-employ 0.034 0.068 0.374 0.154 0.371 
 
0.172 0.049 0.494 0.124 0.161 
 
s.e. 0.008 0.054 0.093 0.051 0.080 
 
0.038 0.079 0.112 0.042 0.056 
(4) Low pay 0.022 0.051 0.108 0.215 0.605 
 
0.156 0.046 0.163 0.162 0.473 
 
s.e. 0.004 0.050 0.038 0.046 0.067 
 
0.029 0.070 0.072 0.060 0.078 
(5) Higher pay 0.021 0.055 0.052 0.076 0.796 
 
0.136 0.035 0.046 0.056 0.727 
 
s.e. 0.005 0.061 0.028 0.023 0.064 
 
0.019 0.051 0.045 0.027 0.061 
  
(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities  (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
 
  
I II III IV V 
 
I II III IV V 
(6) =(4)-(1) -0.088 -0.063 -0.014 0.110 0.055 
 
-0.281 -0.027 0.035 0.096 0.178 
 
s.e. 0.014 0.029 0.017 0.018 0.023 
 
0.024 0.038 0.027 0.041 0.049 
(7) =(4)-(2) -0.034 -0.101 -0.011 0.090 0.056 
 
-0.162 -0.134 0.015 0.082 0.198 
 
s.e. 0.012 0.080 0.020 0.026 0.050 
 
0.040 0.083 0.034 0.046 0.073 
(8) =(4)-(3) -0.012 -0.017 -0.266 0.061 0.234 
 
-0.016 -0.003 -0.331 0.038 0.312 
 
s.e. 0.006 0.038 0.065 0.028 0.047 
 
0.018 0.040 0.061 0.055 0.042 
(9) =(4)-(5) 0.001 -0.004 0.056 0.139 -0.191 
 
0.020 0.011 0.116 0.106 -0.254 
  s.e. 0.002 0.029 0.017 0.026 0.034   0.014 0.034 0.037 0.037 0.043 
             
 
Females (a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1 
 
  Labour/earnings state, t 
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Labour/earnings  
state, t-1 NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
 
NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
(1) NILF 0.343 0.049 0.041 0.166 0.401 
 
0.624 0.038 0.049 0.103 0.185 
 
s.e. 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.032 0.027 
 
0.070 0.051 0.052 0.041 0.046 
(2) Unemploy 0.295 0.117 0.027 0.189 0.373 
 
0.446 0.088 0.048 0.148 0.271 
 
s.e. 0.032 0.059 0.031 0.033 0.033 
 
0.059 0.062 0.035 0.051 0.059 
(3) Self-employ 0.229 0.026 0.221 0.223 0.302 
 
0.317 0.049 0.296 0.180 0.160 
 
s.e. 0.028 0.030 0.047 0.045 0.038 
 
0.077 0.075 0.145 0.075 0.067 
(4) Low pay 0.154 0.032 0.038 0.329 0.446 
 
0.185 0.024 0.054 0.332 0.405 
 
s.e. 0.022 0.022 0.026 0.058 0.046 
 
0.042 0.072 0.046 0.091 0.078 
(5) Higher pay 0.179 0.025 0.017 0.139 0.640 
 
0.155 0.030 0.014 0.172 0.629 
 
s.e. 0.017 0.019 0.013 0.036 0.035 
 
0.036 0.035 0.023 0.062 0.084 
  
(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
 
  
I II III IV V 
 
I II III IV V 
(6) =(4)-(1) -0.189 -0.017 -0.003 0.163 0.046 
 
-0.439 -0.015 0.005 0.229 0.220 
 
s.e. 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.030 0.024 
 
0.038 0.034 0.021 0.057 0.047 
(7) =(4)-(2) -0.140 -0.085 0.011 0.140 0.074 
 
-0.261 -0.064 0.006 0.184 0.135 
 
s.e. 0.018 0.040 0.015 0.048 0.028 
 
0.031 0.040 0.029 0.050 0.044 
(8) =(4)-(3) -0.074 0.006 -0.183 0.106 0.145 
 
-0.131 -0.025 -0.242 0.153 0.245 
 
s.e. 0.016 0.017 0.038 0.030 0.029 
 
0.057 0.033 0.112 0.059 0.053 
(9) =(4)-(5) -0.025 0.008 0.021 0.190 -0.194 
 
0.030 -0.007 0.040 0.160 -0.224 
  s.e. 0.010 0.009 0.020 0.033 0.030   0.023 0.045 0.027 0.045 0.041 
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Table 5: Estimation by education 
    Males           Females         
  
Degree or higher 
    
Degree or higher 
   
  
(a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1 
 
  Labour/earnings state, t 
 
Labour/earnings  
state, t-1 NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
 
NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
(1) NILF 0.188 0.076 0.120 0.082 0.533 
 
0.295 0.049 0.058 0.115 0.484 
 
s.e. 0.020 0.082 0.047 0.033 0.054 
 
0.024 0.042 0.031 0.033 0.035 
(2) Unemploy 0.130 0.115 0.156 0.086 0.514 
 
0.221 0.088 0.080 0.124 0.488 
 
s.e. 0.021 0.142 0.057 0.036 0.090 
 
0.025 0.053 0.044 0.040 0.052 
(3) Self-employ 0.069 0.051 0.440 0.095 0.346 
 
0.156 0.039 0.260 0.162 0.384 
 
s.e. 0.011 0.090 0.093 0.032 0.059 
 
0.024 0.089 0.069 0.052 0.050 
(4) Low pay 0.044 0.028 0.125 0.142 0.662 
 
0.103 0.017 0.062 0.261 0.556 
 
s.e. 0.007 0.058 0.037 0.049 0.061 
 
0.013 0.034 0.036 0.047 0.042 
(5) Higher pay 0.039 0.025 0.046 0.048 0.842 
 
0.111 0.014 0.024 0.089 0.762 
 
s.e. 0.005 0.073 0.036 0.025 0.059 
 
0.015 0.031 0.026 0.038 0.046 
  
(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
  
I II III IV V 
 
I II III IV V 
(6) =(4)-(1) -0.144 -0.049 0.005 0.060 0.128 
 
-0.191 -0.031 0.004 0.146 0.072 
 
s.e. 0.015 0.043 0.029 0.020 0.038 
 
0.014 0.016 0.015 0.022 0.020 
(7) =(4)-(2) -0.086 -0.088 -0.031 0.056 0.148 
 
-0.118 -0.070 -0.018 0.138 0.069 
 
s.e. 0.019 0.127 0.037 0.028 0.093 
 
0.019 0.042 0.025 0.028 0.035 
(8) =(4)-(3) -0.024 -0.023 -0.315 0.046 0.316 
 
-0.052 -0.021 -0.198 0.099 0.172 
 
s.e. 0.007 0.062 0.075 0.033 0.042 
 
0.016 0.064 0.056 0.034 0.037 
(9) =(4)-(5) 0.005 0.003 0.079 0.094 -0.181 
 
-0.007 0.003 0.038 0.172 -0.205 
  s.e. 0.005 0.064 0.025 0.029 0.065   0.009 0.012 0.021 0.022 0.025 
  
Other qualification 
    
Other qualification 
   
  
(a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1 
 
  Labour/earnings state, t 
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Labour/earnings  
state, t-1 NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
 
NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
(1) NILF 0.249 0.105 0.128 0.087 0.432 
 
0.441 0.039 0.037 0.186 0.298 
 
s.e. 0.043 0.065 0.064 0.043 0.064 
 
0.047 0.029 0.021 0.041 0.032 
(2) Unemploy 0.147 0.162 0.131 0.126 0.433 
 
0.353 0.098 0.027 0.206 0.317 
 
s.e. 0.033 0.095 0.074 0.065 0.079 
 
0.043 0.052 0.043 0.036 0.036 
(3) Self-employ 0.074 0.060 0.353 0.196 0.318 
 
0.278 0.052 0.169 0.244 0.258 
 
s.e. 0.022 0.059 0.124 0.115 0.071 
 
0.053 0.055 0.058 0.056 0.046 
(4) Low pay 0.059 0.053 0.129 0.243 0.516 
 
0.169 0.033 0.040 0.367 0.392 
 
s.e. 0.016 0.077 0.061 0.069 0.077 
 
0.036 0.031 0.028 0.068 0.052 
(5) Higher pay 0.061 0.052 0.075 0.078 0.734 
 
0.173 0.039 0.021 0.173 0.595 
 
s.e. 0.019 0.110 0.065 0.035 0.107 
 
0.034 0.039 0.025 0.047 0.061 
  
(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
  
I II III IV V 
 
I II III IV V 
(6) =(4)-(1) -0.190 -0.052 0.002 0.156 0.084 
 
-0.272 -0.006 0.002 0.181 0.094 
 
s.e. 0.029 0.037 0.017 0.035 0.038 
 
0.016 0.010 0.012 0.030 0.027 
(7) =(4)-(2) -0.088 -0.110 -0.001 0.117 0.082 
 
-0.184 -0.065 0.012 0.161 0.075 
 
s.e. 0.021 0.088 0.027 0.035 0.055 
 
0.026 0.037 0.033 0.056 0.038 
(8) =(4)-(3) -0.015 -0.007 -0.224 0.047 0.198 
 
-0.109 -0.019 -0.129 0.123 0.134 
 
s.e. 0.010 0.042 0.076 0.065 0.041 
 
0.027 0.030 0.041 0.033 0.030 
(9) =(4)-(5) -0.002 0.001 0.054 0.165 -0.219 
 
-0.004 -0.006 0.019 0.194 -0.203 
  s.e. 0.006 0.050 0.019 0.038 0.050   0.013 0.015 0.027 0.047 0.039 
  
No qualification 
    
No qualification 
   
  
(a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1 
 
  Labour/earnings state, t 
 
Labour/earnings  
state, t-1 NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
 
NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
(1) NILF 0.427 0.155 0.110 0.106 0.203 
 
0.697 0.052 0.018 0.147 0.085 
 
s.e. 0.114 0.114 0.090 0.058 0.074 
 
0.157 0.093 0.112 0.083 0.047 
(2) Unemploy 0.297 0.230 0.103 0.132 0.238 
 
0.556 0.135 0.022 0.181 0.106 
 
s.e. 0.083 0.171 0.167 0.100 0.082 
 
0.171 0.153 0.112 0.098 0.049 
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(3) Self-employ 0.201 0.139 0.332 0.161 0.167 
 
0.399 0.185 0.091 0.234 0.091 
 
s.e. 0.086 0.176 0.170 0.108 0.092 
 
0.154 0.293 0.295 0.101 0.045 
(4) Low pay 0.198 0.107 0.104 0.229 0.363 
 
0.325 0.038 0.025 0.415 0.197 
 
s.e. 0.079 0.146 0.120 0.109 0.128 
 
0.112 0.085 0.143 0.144 0.091 
(5) Higher pay 0.167 0.100 0.052 0.129 0.552 
 
0.275 0.054 0.014 0.296 0.362 
 
s.e. 0.062 0.093 0.090 0.085 0.137 
 
0.103 0.076 0.140 0.099 0.137 
  
(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
  
I II III IV V 
 
I II III IV V 
(6) =(4)-(1) -0.229 -0.049 -0.005 0.123 0.160 
 
-0.372 -0.014 0.007 0.268 0.112 
 
s.e. 0.041 0.059 0.072 0.059 0.069 
 
0.068 0.048 0.051 0.079 0.054 
(7) =(4)-(2) -0.100 -0.123 0.002 0.097 0.125 
 
-0.231 -0.097 0.003 0.234 0.091 
 
s.e. 0.065 0.236 0.103 0.062 0.081 
 
0.078 0.089 0.079 0.077 0.056 
(8) =(4)-(3) -0.003 -0.032 -0.228 0.068 0.195 
 
-0.074 -0.147 -0.066 0.180 0.106 
 
s.e. 0.031 0.088 0.155 0.114 0.066 
 
0.117 0.323 0.181 0.123 0.072 
(9) =(4)-(5) 0.030 0.006 0.052 0.100 -0.189 
 
0.050 -0.016 0.011 0.119 -0.165 
  s.e. 0.031 0.083 0.054 0.060 0.074   0.046 0.034 0.045 0.078 0.077 
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Table 6: NMWs and low pay dynamics 
  Males Wave 1-8          Wave 9-18        
  
(a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1 
 
  Labour/earnings state, t 
 
Labour/earnings  
state, t-1 NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
 
NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
(1) NILF 0.208 0.149 0.103 0.070 0.469 
 
0.247 0.072 0.138 0.090 0.453 
 
s.e. 0.039 0.105 0.056 0.035 0.081 
 
0.020 0.031 0.036 0.022 0.035 
(2) Unemploy 0.130 0.177 0.128 0.091 0.475 
 
0.172 0.113 0.140 0.116 0.460 
 
s.e. 0.028 0.157 0.070 0.054 0.094 
 
0.019 0.042 0.038 0.028 0.045 
(3) Self-employ 0.074 0.087 0.460 0.084 0.294 
 
0.107 0.051 0.329 0.161 0.352 
 
s.e. 0.024 0.106 0.109 0.045 0.086 
 
0.012 0.031 0.055 0.046 0.047 
(4) Low pay 0.063 0.055 0.103 0.187 0.593 
 
0.081 0.046 0.132 0.178 0.563 
 
s.e. 0.015 0.127 0.062 0.075 0.102 
 
0.009 0.028 0.033 0.033 0.044 
(5) Higher pay 0.066 0.058 0.050 0.068 0.759 
 
0.078 0.044 0.073 0.077 0.729 
 
s.e. 0.013 0.075 0.039 0.034 0.080 
 
0.007 0.026 0.030 0.021 0.035 
  
(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities  (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
 
  
I II III IV V 
 
I II III IV V 
(6) =(4)-(1) -0.146 -0.095 0.000 0.117 0.124 
 
-0.166 -0.026 -0.006 0.089 0.110 
 
s.e. 0.026 0.055 0.025 0.045 0.041 
 
0.013 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.019 
(7) =(4)-(2) -0.068 -0.123 -0.025 0.096 0.118 
 
-0.091 -0.066 -0.008 0.062 0.103 
 
s.e. 0.028 0.219 0.047 0.071 0.114 
 
0.013 0.025 0.017 0.019 0.024 
(8) =(4)-(3) -0.012 -0.033 -0.357 0.103 0.299 
 
-0.026 -0.005 -0.197 0.017 0.211 
 
s.e. 0.013 0.068 0.067 0.044 0.062 
 
0.007 0.018 0.036 0.031 0.027 
(9) =(4)-(5) -0.004 -0.003 0.053 0.119 -0.166 
 
0.003 0.003 0.059 0.101 -0.166 
  s.e. 0.007 0.072 0.036 0.047 0.048   0.005 0.017 0.015 0.017 0.021 
             
 
Females (a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1 
 
  Labour/earnings state, t 
 
Labour/earnings  
state, t-1 NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
 
NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
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(1) NILF 0.407 0.044 0.036 0.170 0.344 
 
0.399 0.044 0.042 0.141 0.374 
 
s.e. 0.047 0.053 0.033 0.056 0.038 
 
0.030 0.029 0.012 0.025 0.025 
(2) Unemploy 0.316 0.103 0.039 0.175 0.368 
 
0.345 0.090 0.034 0.161 0.370 
 
s.e. 0.046 0.082 0.036 0.053 0.048 
 
0.029 0.047 0.021 0.026 0.028 
(3) Self-employ 0.275 0.050 0.167 0.185 0.323 
 
0.241 0.033 0.165 0.235 0.326 
 
s.e. 0.050 0.081 0.086 0.070 0.054 
 
0.030 0.040 0.039 0.041 0.037 
(4) Low pay 0.186 0.027 0.040 0.320 0.428 
 
0.175 0.028 0.045 0.305 0.448 
 
s.e. 0.037 0.051 0.042 0.082 0.056 
 
0.022 0.028 0.015 0.046 0.040 
(5) Higher pay 0.194 0.036 0.026 0.164 0.580 
 
0.195 0.024 0.024 0.152 0.605 
 
s.e. 0.033 0.047 0.028 0.057 0.053 
 
0.018 0.025 0.010 0.028 0.030 
  
(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
 
  
I II III IV V 
 
I II III IV V 
(6) =(4)-(1) -0.221 -0.017 0.004 0.150 0.083 
 
-0.225 -0.017 0.004 0.164 0.074 
 
s.e. 0.018 0.021 0.015 0.033 0.025 
 
0.012 0.008 0.006 0.024 0.019 
(7) =(4)-(2) -0.130 -0.076 0.001 0.145 0.060 
 
-0.170 -0.062 0.011 0.144 0.078 
 
s.e. 0.022 0.054 0.036 0.046 0.030 
 
0.017 0.035 0.022 0.031 0.029 
(8) =(4)-(3) -0.089 -0.024 -0.127 0.135 0.104 
 
-0.067 -0.006 -0.120 0.070 0.122 
 
s.e. 0.030 0.041 0.057 0.039 0.037 
 
0.015 0.018 0.030 0.024 0.025 
(9) =(4)-(5) -0.008 -0.009 0.014 0.156 -0.152 
 
-0.021 0.003 0.021 0.153 -0.157 
  s.e. 0.013 0.016 0.023 0.034 0.030   0.008 0.009 0.007 0.023 0.015 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 7: Estimation results using the Understanding Society data 
  Males           
  
(a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, 
  
      conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1 
  
Labour/earnings state, t 
  
Labour/earnings  
state, t-1 NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
(1) NILF 0.106 0.070 0.173 0.239 0.412 
 
s.e. 0.042 0.171 0.076 0.099 0.113 
(2) Unemploy 0.069 0.129 0.169 0.202 0.432 
 
s.e. 0.035 0.200 0.075 0.100 0.131 
(3) Self-employ 0.075 0.052 0.270 0.237 0.367 
 
s.e. 0.035 0.153 0.110 0.108 0.122 
(4) Low pay 0.059 0.046 0.151 0.272 0.472 
 
s.e. 0.025 0.162 0.071 0.107 0.120 
(5) Higher pay 0.062 0.049 0.127 0.160 0.601 
 
s.e. 0.024 0.153 0.061 0.078 0.127 
  
(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities 
  
      (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
  
I II III IV V 
(6) =(4)-(1) -0.047 -0.024 -0.022 0.032 0.060 
 
s.e. 0.019 0.036 0.017 0.023 0.027 
(7) =(4)-(2) -0.010 -0.083 -0.017 0.070 0.041 
 
s.e. 0.014 0.070 0.027 0.031 0.041 
(8) =(4)-(3) -0.016 -0.006 -0.118 0.034 0.106 
 
s.e. 0.013 0.047 0.055 0.041 0.042 
(9) =(4)-(5) -0.003 -0.004 0.024 0.112 -0.129 
  s.e. 0.006 0.033 0.024 0.035 0.037 
 
Females 
     
  
(a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, 
  
      conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1 
  
Labour/earnings state, t 
  
Labour/earnings  
state, t-1 NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
(1) NILF 0.3262 0.0627 0.0589 0.1798 0.3723 
 
s.e. 0.0336 0.0251 0.0277 0.0389 0.0342 
(2) Unemploy 0.2935 0.1305 0.0556 0.164 0.3564 
 
s.e. 0.0387 0.0437 0.0285 0.043 0.0391 
(3) Self-employ 0.2349 0.0387 0.1473 0.2761 0.303 
 
s.e. 0.0313 0.0214 0.053 0.0573 0.042 
(4) Low pay 0.2133 0.036 0.0633 0.2894 0.398 
 
s.e. 0.0279 0.0197 0.034 0.0525 0.0437 
(5) Higher pay 0.2706 0.0334 0.0382 0.1815 0.4763 
 
s.e. 0.0262 0.0183 0.0211 0.0359 0.0328 
  
(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities 
  
      (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
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I II III IV V 
(6) =(4)-(1) -0.1129 -0.0267 0.0044 0.1096 0.0257 
 
s.e. 0.0121 0.0138 0.0111 0.0219 0.0155 
(7) =(4)-(2) -0.0802 -0.0945 0.0076 0.1255 0.0416 
 
s.e. 0.0198 0.0299 0.0135 0.0285 0.0223 
(8) =(4)-(3) -0.0216 -0.0026 -0.0841 0.0134 0.0949 
 
s.e. 0.017 0.0184 0.0298 0.0284 0.0224 
(9) =(4)-(5) -0.0573 0.0027 0.025 0.1079 -0.0784 
  s.e. 0.0096 0.0097 0.0151 0.023 0.0185 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Variable-addition test results 
  Unemploy Self-employ Low-pay Higher-pay 
 
Males 
   Attrition indicator 0.074  -0.226* -0.180  -0.219* 
s.e. 0.118 0.134 0.123 0.115 
Prop time responding 0.063  -0.221* -0.183  -0.233** 
s.e. 0.118 0.133 0.121 0.115 
All time indicator  -0.360***  -0.218**  -0.240*** -0.122 
s.e. 0.088 0.099 0.086 0.084 
 
Females 
   Attrition indicator  0.243**  -0.293** -0.049  -0.134* 
s.e. 0.100 0.140 0.080 0.081 
Prop time responding  0.247**  -0.286** -0.047 -0.124 
s.e. 0.100 0.140 0.080 0.081 
All time indicator  -0.335***  -0.293*** -0.004 -0.087 
s.e. 0.065 0.098 0.054 0.056 
 
*** indicates significant at 1%; ** 5%; and * 10% respectively.
  
 
 
Table 9: Comparison between unweighted and weighted results from pooled models 
  Males Unweighted         Weighted         
  
(a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1 
 
  Labour/earnings state, t 
 
Labour/earnings  
state, t-1 NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
 
NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
(1) NILF 0.402 0.096 0.089 0.074 0.339 
 
0.402 0.099 0.093 0.078 0.329 
 
s.e. 0.031 0.032 0.025 0.013 0.030 
 
0.018 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.020 
(2) Unemploy 0.161 0.294 0.104 0.118 0.323 
 
0.165 0.271 0.097 0.124 0.343 
 
s.e. 0.020 0.057 0.028 0.023 0.040 
 
0.012 0.038 0.013 0.022 0.028 
(3) Self-employ 0.046 0.036 0.736 0.075 0.107 
 
0.050 0.035 0.736 0.075 0.105 
 
s.e. 0.011 0.017 0.053 0.020 0.032 
 
0.006 0.008 0.027 0.010 0.018 
(4) Low pay 0.047 0.052 0.095 0.326 0.481 
 
0.046 0.056 0.095 0.325 0.479 
 
s.e. 0.007 0.028 0.024 0.033 0.044 
 
0.003 0.013 0.014 0.024 0.027 
(5) Higher pay 0.042 0.031 0.024 0.055 0.848 
 
0.041 0.034 0.024 0.054 0.847 
 
s.e. 0.005 0.017 0.012 0.011 0.026 
 
0.004 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.018 
  
(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities  (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
 
  
I II III IV V 
 
I II III IV V 
(6) =(4)-(1) -0.355 -0.045 0.006 0.252 0.142 
 
-0.356 -0.043 0.002 0.248 0.150 
 
s.e. 0.025 0.014 0.010 0.023 0.027 
 
0.015 0.013 0.017 0.018 0.013 
(7) =(4)-(2) -0.114 -0.242 -0.010 0.208 0.158 
 
-0.120 -0.216 -0.002 0.202 0.136 
 
s.e. 0.016 0.053 0.014 0.022 0.033 
 
0.010 0.035 0.013 0.021 0.016 
(8) =(4)-(3) 0.001 0.016 -0.641 0.251 0.374 
 
-0.004 0.021 -0.641 0.250 0.374 
 
s.e. 0.007 0.018 0.041 0.025 0.035 
 
0.004 0.012 0.027 0.019 0.021 
(9) =(4)-(5) 0.005 0.021 0.071 0.270 -0.368 
 
0.005 0.022 0.071 0.271 -0.369 
  s.e. 0.004 0.015 0.014 0.025 0.026   0.003 0.010 0.014 0.019 0.017 
             
 
Females (a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1 
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  Labour/earnings state, t 
 
Labour/earnings  
state, t-1 NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
 
NILF Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low pay 
Higher 
pay 
(1) NILF 0.594 0.046 0.028 0.113 0.219 
 
0.600 0.047 0.028 0.109 0.216 
 
s.e. 0.027 0.017 0.012 0.021 0.015 
 
0.016 0.011 0.006 0.012 0.009 
(2) Unemploy 0.369 0.175 0.031 0.180 0.246 
 
0.380 0.171 0.031 0.178 0.241 
 
s.e. 0.032 0.040 0.013 0.026 0.023 
 
0.020 0.033 0.008 0.018 0.020 
(3) Self-employ 0.142 0.030 0.588 0.128 0.112 
 
0.137 0.031 0.591 0.133 0.108 
 
s.e. 0.027 0.021 0.077 0.035 0.025 
 
0.016 0.013 0.048 0.021 0.015 
(4) Low pay 0.115 0.028 0.032 0.496 0.329 
 
0.118 0.028 0.033 0.497 0.325 
 
s.e. 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.044 0.031 
 
0.007 0.007 0.008 0.026 0.021 
(5) Higher pay 0.105 0.018 0.010 0.110 0.757 
 
0.105 0.018 0.010 0.110 0.758 
 
s.e. 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.019 0.022 
 
0.005 0.005 0.003 0.011 0.014 
  
(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
 
  
I II III IV V 
 
I II III IV V 
(6) =(4)-(1) -0.479 -0.018 0.004 0.383 0.110 
 
-0.482 -0.019 0.005 0.387 0.109 
 
s.e. 0.015 0.007 0.006 0.026 0.024 
 
0.010 0.005 0.003 0.015 0.016 
(7) =(4)-(2) -0.254 -0.147 0.001 0.317 0.084 
 
-0.262 -0.144 0.002 0.319 0.085 
 
s.e. 0.021 0.031 0.008 0.026 0.022 
 
0.016 0.027 0.004 0.014 0.013 
(8) =(4)-(3) -0.028 -0.002 -0.556 0.369 0.218 
 
-0.020 -0.003 -0.558 0.363 0.218 
 
s.e. 0.024 0.016 0.071 0.032 0.032 
 
0.015 0.010 0.045 0.020 0.021 
(9) =(4)-(5) 0.010 0.010 0.022 0.387 -0.428 
 
0.012 0.010 0.023 0.387 -0.432 
  s.e. 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.027 0.017   0.005 0.003 0.006 0.016 0.010 
 Table A1: Summary statistics 
     
  All 
Out of labour 
force Unemployed 
Self-
employed 
Low-
paid 
Higher 
paid 
  
Males 
    Out of labour force, t-1 12.82 80.10 16.21 3.27 6.18 2.84 
Unemployed, t-1 5.76 7.48 50.11 2.41 8.29 1.78 
Self-employed, t-1 13.84 2.38 4.70 81.68 7.84 1.49 
Low pay, t-1 9.16 2.04 9.54 4.79 47.82 6.14 
Higher pay, t-1 58.42 8.00 19.44 7.85 29.87 87.75 
Age 18-24 8.76 1.80 21.36 3.05 27.05 7.74 
Age 25-34 23.50 6.19 25.67 19.15 24.44 27.52 
Age 35-44 26.53 12.93 21.48 28.60 17.75 30.34 
Age 45-54 22.86 21.94 17.59 28.17 16.09 23.19 
Age 55 plus 18.35 57.14 13.90 21.03 14.67 11.21 
1st degree or higher 15.70 7.46 8.11 13.08 7.68 19.73 
Other higher degree 31.26 22.26 20.02 30.74 24.01 35.15 
A-level(s) 12.80 10.97 10.79 12.96 14.70 13.03 
O-level(s) 16.81 13.33 18.18 18.93 20.23 16.36 
Other qualifications 7.58 9.73 10.49 8.15 10.62 6.34 
No qualification 15.85 36.25 32.41 16.14 22.76 9.39 
Married or partnered 74.86 71.32 54.53 81.96 58.48 78.00 
Disability 12.84 56.04 20.22 7.18 9.57 5.70 
London 6.76 5.11 7.91 7.44 4.45 7.12 
South East 10.47 6.48 7.77 12.19 6.73 11.59 
Other regions 82.77 88.41 84.32 80.37 88.82 81.29 
Unemployment rate 6.25 6.21 6.97 6.19 6.15 6.22 
Youngest child 0-2 10.85 2.96 12.78 11.37 9.98 12.18 
Youngest child 3-4 4.70 1.77 4.22 4.93 3.50 5.41 
Youngest child 5-11 11.86 6.39 9.42 14.29 7.66 13.14 
Youngest child 12-16 7.22 5.48 5.48 8.84 4.91 7.65 
Youngest child 17-18 2.45 1.97 1.87 3.20 1.46 2.55 
No children under 19 62.92 81.43 66.23 57.37 72.49 59.07 
Total children under 19  0.67 0.36 0.66 0.82 0.50 0.72 
       Number of 
observations 64,310 7,403 3,576 9,252 5,393 38,686 
  
Females 
    Out of labour force, t-1 27.70 79.78 33.50 9.78 12.32 5.89 
Unemployed, t-1 3.16 4.26 29.29 1.41 3.03 1.14 
Self-employed, t-1 4.58 1.39 2.50 70.79 2.17 0.72 
Low pay, t-1 18.52 5.97 16.60 9.87 62.18 10.16 
Higher pay, t-1 46.04 8.60 18.11 8.15 20.30 82.09 
Age 18-24 9.03 6.61 20.33 2.64 14.73 8.19 
Age 25-34 25.54 24.69 25.00 20.60 21.20 28.17 
Age 35-44 28.56 24.38 22.97 34.07 28.30 30.77 
Age 45-54 24.34 22.42 22.03 31.09 24.90 24.66 
Age 55 plus 12.53 21.90 9.67 11.60 10.87 8.21 
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1st degree or higher 14.26 7.13 8.96 20.39 4.33 21.66 
Other higher degree 27.02 18.07 19.25 34.84 23.76 32.93 
A-level(s) 11.24 8.91 11.79 11.49 12.50 12.01 
O-level(s) 21.22 21.74 22.41 16.85 24.57 20.05 
Other qualifications 8.99 12.28 11.65 7.53 11.24 6.29 
No qualification 17.27 31.87 25.94 8.90 23.60 7.06 
Married or partnered 73.58 75.69 46.70 79.99 72.24 73.94 
Disability 14.03 30.17 20.42 9.93 9.57 6.71 
London 6.76 5.54 9.20 9.52 2.92 8.44 
South East 10.79 8.72 10.33 12.77 10.24 11.97 
Other regions 82.45 85.74 80.47 77.71 86.84 79.59 
Unemployment rate 6.24 6.27 6.55 6.16 6.18 6.23 
Youngest child 0-2 12.45 23.50 10.14 9.43 7.82 8.48 
Youngest child 3-4 6.12 8.54 5.75 6.01 5.58 5.01 
Youngest child 5-11 17.04 16.58 14.29 18.90 20.63 15.93 
Youngest child 12-16 10.63 8.10 8.63 12.07 13.05 11.11 
Youngest child 17-18 3.36 2.62 2.88 3.34 4.05 3.54 
No children under 19 50.40 40.66 58.31 50.25 48.87 55.93 
Total children under 19  0.92 1.22 0.73 0.95 0.94 0.75 
       Number of 
observations 71,035 18,897 2,120 3,413 12,692 33,913 
 
 
  
Table a2: Coefficient estimates 
          Unweighted 
 
Weighted 
 
Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low-pay Higher-pay 
 
Unemploy 
Self-
employ Low-pay Higher-pay 
Males 
         Unemployed, t-1  1.498***  1.052***  1.280***  0.978*** 
 
 0.666***  0.615***  0.899***  0.830*** 
Self-employed, t-1  1.473***  4.153***  2.722***  1.710*** 
 
 0.929***  3.072***  1.984***  1.221*** 
Low pay, t-1  1.859***  2.847***  3.810***  3.298*** 
 
 1.445***  2.282***  2.851***  2.918*** 
Higher pay, t-1  1.875***  1.978***  2.862***  4.116*** 
 
 1.882***  1.668***  2.380***  3.700*** 
Age 18-24  1.602***  0.649***  2.193***  1.180*** 
 
 1.754***  0.504***  2.417***  1.210*** 
Age 25-34  0.702***  0.664***  0.978***  0.738*** 
 
 0.811***  0.704***  1.142***  0.869*** 
Age 45-54  -0.922***  -1.116***  -1.060***  -1.293*** 
 
 -1.128***  -1.425***  -1.270***  -1.645*** 
Age 55 plus  -2.398***  -2.863***  -2.602***  -3.351*** 
 
 -2.637***  -3.373***  -2.998***  -3.886*** 
1st degree or higher -0.194  0.850*** -0.216  1.394*** 
 
 -0.236*  1.037*** 0.058  1.830*** 
Other higher degree  -0.457***  0.546***  -0.307***  0.788*** 
 
 -0.525***  0.695*** -0.106  1.063*** 
A-level(s)  -0.568***  0.333**  -0.371**  0.419*** 
 
 -0.512***  0.394*** -0.071  0.647*** 
O-level(s)  -0.261*  0.549*** -0.077  0.612*** 
 
 -0.391***  0.695***  0.189*  0.832*** 
Other qualifications  -0.393** 0.230  -0.280* 0.151 
 
 -0.276**  0.428*** -0.081  0.299** 
Married or partnered -0.054  0.489*** 0.244  0.444*** 
 
 0.183**  0.689***  0.449***  0.692*** 
Disability  -1.044***  -1.716***  -1.579***  -1.809*** 
 
 -0.977***  -1.882***  -1.755***  -2.038*** 
London 0.011  0.684*** -0.132  0.395** 
 
0.082  0.576*** -0.208 0.175 
South East 0.165  0.339** -0.188  0.335** 
 
0.075  0.274** -0.169  0.392*** 
Unemployment rate 4.611  -9.437** -2.862  -6.227* 
 
3.714  -7.616** -2.518 -3.467 
Youngest child 0-2 0.265 0.053 -0.213 -0.042 
 
0.184 -0.135  -0.373***  -0.248** 
Youngest child 3-4 0.075 0.035 -0.180 0.073 
 
0.212 0.059 -0.160 0.025 
Youngest child 5-11 0.200  0.383* 0.061  0.308* 
 
 0.312**  0.446*** 0.125  0.334*** 
Youngest child 12-16  0.664***  0.715***  0.616***  0.811*** 
 
 0.894***  0.951***  0.727***  0.937*** 
Youngest child 17-18  0.567** 0.377 0.172  0.440** 
 
 0.735***  0.558*** 0.242  0.558*** 
Total children under 19   -0.265***  -0.292***  -0.260***  -0.327*** 
 
 -0.374***  -0.364***  -0.318***  -0.413*** 
Married or partnered: Mean  -0.642*** -0.046 -0.190 0.148 
 
 -1.498***  -0.383***  -0.472*** -0.132 
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Disability: Mean  -2.055***  -3.797***  -2.817***  -3.648*** 
 
 -2.855***  -4.850***  -3.989***  -4.873*** 
Total children: mean  0.397***  0.347***  0.319***  0.242*** 
 
 0.621***  0.454***  0.392***  0.315*** 
Unemployed, t0  1.609***  0.874***  0.689*** 0.189 
 
 2.280***  1.147***  0.688*** 0.144 
Self-employed, t0  1.147***  4.464***  1.516***  1.291*** 
 
 2.001***  6.440***  2.135***  1.771*** 
Low pay, t0  1.233***  1.896***  2.003***  1.610*** 
 
 2.208***  2.895***  2.934***  2.285*** 
Higher pay, t0  0.509***  1.487***  1.004***  1.945*** 
 
 0.589***  1.899***  1.376***  2.805*** 
Wave 3 -0.291 -0.200 -0.049 -0.192 
 
 -0.494***  -0.464** -0.279  -0.483*** 
Wave 4 -0.264 -0.293 0.099 -0.132 
 
 -0.534***  -0.607*** -0.170  -0.469*** 
Wave 5  -0.798***  -0.506** -0.164  -0.373* 
 
 -1.218***  -0.894***  -0.512***  -0.785*** 
Wave 6  -0.598*** -0.303 0.102 -0.294 
 
 -1.086***  -0.730*** -0.262  -0.722*** 
Wave 7  -1.019***  -0.862*** -0.213  -0.470** 
 
 -1.554***  -1.228***  -0.547***  -0.811*** 
Wave 8  -1.031***  -0.919*** -0.155  -0.509** 
 
 -1.681***  -1.317***  -0.584***  -0.880*** 
Wave 9  -1.647***  -1.690***  -0.849***  -1.271*** 
 
 -2.353***  -2.183***  -1.270***  -1.679*** 
Wave 10  -1.343***  -1.175*** -0.345  -0.904*** 
 
 -2.038***  -1.588***  -0.688***  -1.211*** 
Wave 11  -1.021***  -0.910*** -0.056  -0.656*** 
 
 -1.744***  -1.341***  -0.452**  -1.008*** 
Wave 12  -1.181***  -1.084***  -0.442*  -0.815*** 
 
 -1.805***  -1.385***  -0.662***  -1.043*** 
Wave 13  -0.935***  -0.723** -0.074  -0.567** 
 
 -1.668***  -1.197***  -0.617***  -1.100*** 
Wave 14  -1.878***  -1.557***  -0.964***  -1.363*** 
 
 -2.825***  -2.075***  -1.524***  -1.816*** 
Wave 15  -1.181***  -0.851*** -0.034  -0.787*** 
 
 -2.142***  -1.380***  -0.540**  -1.267*** 
Wave 16  -1.303***  -0.871*** -0.360  -0.841*** 
 
 -2.159***  -1.402***  -0.994***  -1.368*** 
Wave 17  -1.580***  -1.001***  -0.519*  -0.934*** 
 
 -2.669***  -1.717***  -1.197***  -1.522*** 
Wave 18  -1.120***  -0.960*** -0.333  -0.902*** 
 
 -1.963***  -1.348***  -0.837***  -1.229*** 
Constant  0.850* -0.781 -0.154  1.023** 
 
 1.978*** -0.331  0.800**  1.819*** 
          c11  1.675*** 
    
 2.757*** 
   c21  1.515*** 
    
 2.329*** 
   c22  1.835*** 
    
 2.885*** 
   c31  1.363*** 
    
 2.073*** 
   c32  0.541*** 
    
 1.290*** 
   c33  1.146*** 
    
 1.969*** 
   c41  1.148*** 
    
 1.328*** 
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c42  0.699*** 
    
 1.180*** 
   c43  0.644*** 
    
 1.126*** 
   c44  1.140*** 
    
 1.735*** 
   
          Log-likelihood -35227.09                 
          Females 
         Unemployed, t-1  1.348***  0.366*  0.650***  0.480*** 
 
 0.545*** 0.025  0.474***  0.220*** 
Self-employed, t-1  0.935***  3.382***  1.519***  0.927*** 
 
 0.512***  2.877***  1.320***  0.665*** 
Low pay, t-1  1.077***  1.840***  2.738***  2.231*** 
 
 0.969***  1.702***  2.348***  1.993*** 
Higher pay, t-1  0.911***  0.905***  1.710***  2.893*** 
 
 0.690***  0.531***  1.455***  2.402*** 
Age 18-24  0.815***  -0.485***  1.037***  0.381*** 
 
 0.758***  -0.377***  1.059***  0.197*** 
Age 25-34  0.289*** 0.041  0.199***  0.250*** 
 
 0.142**  0.134**  0.107***  0.177*** 
Age 45-54  -0.706***  -0.746***  -0.612***  -0.913*** 
 
 -0.783***  -0.784***  -0.630***  -0.953*** 
Age 55 plus  -1.921***  -2.126***  -1.867***  -2.546*** 
 
 -2.174***  -2.351***  -2.047***  -2.809*** 
1st degree or higher 0.197  2.122*** -0.030  2.395*** 
 
 0.590***  2.591*** 0.093  2.690*** 
Other higher degree 0.143  1.741***  0.433***  1.671*** 
 
 0.484***  2.101***  0.666***  1.746*** 
A-level(s) 0.177  1.324***  0.459***  1.508*** 
 
 0.278***  1.538***  0.658***  1.573*** 
O-level(s) 0.093  0.905***  0.309***  1.071*** 
 
 0.329***  1.147***  0.423***  1.071*** 
Other qualifications -0.032  0.544*** 0.064  0.563*** 
 
0.109  0.549*** 0.081  0.466*** 
Married or partnered  -0.540*** 0.204  -0.165**  -0.131* 
 
 -0.458***  0.252***  -0.172***  -0.081* 
Disability  -0.318***  -0.605***  -0.750***  -0.883*** 
 
 -0.392***  -0.701***  -0.801***  -0.951*** 
London 0.071  0.484**  -0.621***  0.271** 
 
0.118  0.269**  -0.796***  0.313*** 
South East  0.444***  0.344**  0.206**  0.434*** 
 
 0.715***  0.517***  0.378***  0.543*** 
Unemployment rate  9.459***  -8.452** 2.564 2.851 
 
13.085***  -8.065***  7.698***  7.239*** 
Youngest child 0-2  -2.395***  -2.671***  -2.790***  -3.000*** 
 
 -2.663***  -3.080***  -3.220***  -3.324*** 
Youngest child 3-4  -1.622***  -1.791***  -1.685***  -1.878*** 
 
 -1.923***  -2.062***  -2.011***  -2.159*** 
Youngest child 5-11  -1.081***  -1.156***  -0.751***  -1.027*** 
 
 -1.303***  -1.349***  -0.993***  -1.222*** 
Youngest child 12-16  -0.391***  -0.522*** -0.076 -0.084 
 
 -0.545***  -0.620***  -0.159***  -0.102* 
Youngest child 17-18 0.009 -0.184 0.195  0.248** 
 
0.061 -0.246  0.155*  0.296*** 
Total children under 19   -0.141**  0.212***  0.085**  -0.121*** 
 
 -0.180***  0.271***  0.130***  -0.158*** 
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Married or partnered: Mean  -0.594*** -0.058 0.001 -0.033 
 
 -0.978*** 0.071 -0.080  -0.197** 
Disability: Mean  -1.141***  -2.058***  -2.076***  -2.750*** 
 
 -1.340***  -2.884***  -2.597***  -3.541*** 
Total children: mean 0.067  -0.208***  -0.091**  -0.089** 
 
 0.104**  -0.268***  -0.064** -0.053 
Unemployed, t0  1.037*** 0.363  0.459***  0.298** 
 
 1.798***  0.732***  0.748***  0.548*** 
Self-employed, t0  0.441**  3.869***  0.761***  0.476*** 
 
 1.095***  4.889***  1.142***  0.874*** 
Low pay, t0  0.664***  0.836***  1.592***  1.286*** 
 
 0.714***  1.112***  1.996***  1.567*** 
Higher pay, t0  0.610***  0.789***  0.764***  2.292*** 
 
 0.700***  1.050***  0.918***  2.802*** 
Wave 3 0.054 0.200 0.155  0.213* 
 
0.007 0.144 0.101 0.139 
Wave 4 0.021 0.208  0.214*  0.211* 
 
0.025 0.196  0.237**  0.194* 
Wave 5 0.171 -0.048  0.206*  0.241** 
 
0.170 -0.105  0.236**  0.231** 
Wave 6 0.131 0.025  0.352*** 0.198 
 
0.089 -0.009  0.406***  0.195* 
Wave 7 0.048 -0.038 0.223  0.322** 
 
0.040 -0.078  0.333***  0.373*** 
Wave 8 0.080 -0.297  0.348**  0.308** 
 
0.038  -0.343*  0.449***  0.376*** 
Wave 9 0.138 -0.289 0.215 0.147 
 
0.129 -0.242  0.344***  0.242** 
Wave 10  0.479** 0.024  0.348**  0.374*** 
 
 0.492*** 0.038  0.493***  0.484*** 
Wave 11 0.236 -0.353  0.422***  0.393*** 
 
0.238 -0.328  0.559***  0.503*** 
Wave 12 0.257 -0.297  0.366**  0.379*** 
 
 0.358** -0.256  0.511***  0.473*** 
Wave 13  0.382* -0.181 0.190  0.418*** 
 
 0.365** -0.212  0.303**  0.528*** 
Wave 14 0.273 -0.371 0.141  0.347** 
 
 0.325* -0.323  0.280**  0.507*** 
Wave 15 0.325 -0.234 0.219  0.381** 
 
 0.302* -0.195  0.317***  0.485*** 
Wave 16 0.252 0.021  0.302*  0.457*** 
 
0.267 0.017  0.406***  0.525*** 
Wave 17 0.239 -0.057  0.309*  0.432*** 
 
0.172 -0.012  0.402***  0.541*** 
Wave 18 0.280 -0.199 0.207  0.364** 
 
0.158 -0.238  0.299***  0.454*** 
Constant  -1.806***  -3.650***  -1.178***  -1.663*** 
 
 -2.195***  -4.136***  -1.471***  -1.623*** 
          c11(a)  1.136*** 
    
 1.993*** 
   c21  0.850*** 
    
 1.571*** 
   c22  -1.934*** 
    
 2.423*** 
   c31  0.975*** 
    
 0.981*** 
   c32  -0.205*** 
    
 0.489*** 
   c33  -1.059*** 
    
 1.747*** 
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c41  0.891*** 
    
 0.939*** 
   c42  -0.186*** 
    
 0.551*** 
   c43  -0.687*** 
    
 1.120*** 
   c44  1.288*** 
    
 1.845*** 
   
          Log-likelihood -47757.93                 
Note: (a). c11-c44 are estimates for the elements of the lower-triangular matrix of the Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of random 
effects.
  
Table A3: Pooled model estimates, accounting for panel attrition 
  Males   Females 
 
Unweighted Weighted 
 
Unweighted Weighted 
Covariates Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.   Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
Unemployment 
         Unemployed, t-1  2.542*** 0.074  2.402*** 0.034 
 
 2.038*** 0.073  1.975*** 0.039 
Self-employed, t-1  2.136*** 0.137  1.955*** 0.073 
 
 1.298*** 0.174  1.357*** 0.108 
Low pay, t-1  2.505*** 0.116  2.576*** 0.060 
 
 1.550*** 0.079  1.511*** 0.045 
Higher pay, t-1  2.225*** 0.087  2.316*** 0.047 
 
 1.322*** 0.081  1.272*** 0.049 
Age 18-24  1.406*** 0.127  1.467*** 0.059 
 
 0.671*** 0.100  0.659*** 0.055 
Age 25-34  0.632*** 0.095  0.660*** 0.046 
 
 0.311*** 0.078  0.184*** 0.046 
Age 45-54  -0.535*** 0.088  -0.563*** 0.049 
 
 -0.624*** 0.083  -0.706*** 0.047 
Age 55 plus  -1.608*** 0.093  -1.571*** 0.050 
 
 -1.527*** 0.106  -1.646*** 0.063 
1st degree or higher  -0.369*** 0.106  -0.449*** 0.061 
 
0.062 0.104 0.077 0.061 
Other higher degree  -0.432*** 0.077  -0.427*** 0.040 
 
0.003 0.080 0.041 0.047 
A-level(s)  -0.570*** 0.096  -0.666*** 0.051 
 
0.086 0.094 -0.041 0.053 
O-level(s)  -0.242*** 0.083  -0.270*** 0.045 
 
-0.015 0.075 0.002 0.045 
Other qualifications  -0.366*** 0.101  -0.428*** 0.055 
 
-0.085 0.089 -0.061 0.052 
Married or 
partnered -0.162 0.137 -0.004 0.064 
 
 -0.501*** 0.098  -0.320*** 0.054 
Disability  -0.830*** 0.086  -0.732*** 0.039 
 
 -0.224*** 0.085  -0.284*** 0.051 
London 0.117 0.131 0.120 0.073 
 
0.072 0.114 0.059 0.065 
South East 0.178 0.110  0.185*** 0.062 
 
 0.329*** 0.098  0.357*** 0.061 
Unemployment rate 4.466 3.014  5.091*** 1.827 
 
 8.970*** 2.849  12.427*** 1.749 
Youngest child 0-2  0.353** 0.153  0.239*** 0.082 
 
 -1.818*** 0.121  -1.858*** 0.072 
Youngest child 3-4 0.217 0.189  0.280*** 0.108 
 
 -1.157*** 0.139  -1.248*** 0.085 
Youngest child 5-11 0.232 0.152  0.223** 0.093 
 
 -0.789*** 0.117  -0.821*** 0.069 
Youngest child 12-16  0.470*** 0.141  0.434*** 0.088 
 
 -0.292** 0.114  -0.360*** 0.074 
Youngest child 17-18 0.331 0.216  0.279* 0.144 
 
-0.031 0.160 -0.074 0.105 
Total children under  -0.203*** 0.076  -0.231*** 0.044 
 
 -0.182*** 0.063  -0.205*** 0.041 
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Married or 
partnered: Mean  -0.404*** 0.156  -0.483*** 0.076 
 
 -0.500*** 0.117  -0.578*** 0.065 
Disability: Mean  -1.142*** 0.133  -1.337*** 0.065 
 
 -0.729*** 0.131  -0.771*** 0.081 
Total children: mean  0.263*** 0.072  0.293*** 0.040 
 
 0.102* 0.057  0.112*** 0.037 
Unemployed, t0  0.725*** 0.081  0.787*** 0.042 
 
 0.638*** 0.081  0.764*** 0.041 
Self-employed, t0  0.287** 0.126  0.310*** 0.067 
 
0.191 0.181 0.184 0.122 
Low pay, t0  0.486*** 0.110  0.425*** 0.053 
 
 0.261*** 0.076  0.271*** 0.046 
Higher pay, t0 0.040 0.085 -0.015 0.049 
 
 0.231*** 0.077  0.131*** 0.044 
Wave 3 0.073 0.169 0.073 0.139 
 
0.133 0.152 0.144 0.128 
Wave 4 0.107 0.169 0.116 0.136 
 
0.045 0.156 0.091 0.128 
Wave 5 -0.260 0.176  -0.250* 0.135 
 
0.189 0.159  0.256** 0.125 
Wave 6 0.021 0.180 0.038 0.138 
 
0.164 0.168  0.237* 0.130 
Wave 7  -0.411** 0.195  -0.392*** 0.144 
 
0.051 0.182 0.174 0.135 
Wave 8  -0.393** 0.200  -0.380*** 0.145 
 
0.071 0.189 0.181 0.139 
Wave 9  -0.829*** 0.205  -0.805*** 0.147 
 
0.147 0.189  0.255* 0.139 
Wave 10  -0.646*** 0.195  -0.631*** 0.143 
 
 0.451** 0.177  0.581*** 0.132 
Wave 11 -0.260 0.205  -0.257* 0.148 
 
0.262 0.191  0.422*** 0.140 
Wave 12  -0.410** 0.200  -0.280** 0.138 
 
0.262 0.188  0.515*** 0.129 
Wave 13 -0.117 0.208 0.003 0.144 
 
 0.394** 0.196  0.559*** 0.133 
Wave 14  -0.934*** 0.218  -0.952*** 0.147 
 
0.296 0.202  0.500*** 0.136 
Wave 15 -0.333 0.220  -0.393*** 0.147 
 
 0.349* 0.203  0.522*** 0.133 
Wave 16  -0.412* 0.214  -0.278** 0.141 
 
0.275 0.197  0.445*** 0.132 
Wave 17  -0.675*** 0.220  -0.809*** 0.144 
 
0.264 0.203  0.398*** 0.134 
Wave 18 -0.201 0.211 -0.103 0.138 
 
0.317 0.193  0.417*** 0.130 
Constant  -0.571* 0.340  -0.618*** 0.217 
 
 -2.139*** 0.320  -2.412*** 0.208 
Self-employment 
        Unemployed, t-1  1.527*** 0.114  1.377*** 0.060 
 
 0.747*** 0.173  0.727*** 0.108 
Self-employed, t-1  5.689*** 0.108  5.544*** 0.055 
 
 5.057*** 0.092  5.161*** 0.061 
Low pay, t-1  3.377*** 0.121  3.362*** 0.069 
 
 2.248*** 0.089  2.282*** 0.056 
Higher pay, t-1  2.414*** 0.093  2.397*** 0.054 
 
 1.410*** 0.094  1.416*** 0.059 
50 
 
Age 18-24  0.724*** 0.147  0.699*** 0.073 
 
 -0.447*** 0.150  -0.526*** 0.091 
Age 25-34  0.596*** 0.100  0.617*** 0.051 
 
0.021 0.079 -0.035 0.049 
Age 45-54  -0.651*** 0.093  -0.648*** 0.053 
 
 -0.610*** 0.083  -0.642*** 0.055 
Age 55 plus  -1.920*** 0.097  -1.865*** 0.054 
 
 -1.578*** 0.112  -1.611*** 0.074 
1st degree or higher  0.573*** 0.106  0.669*** 0.064 
 
 1.568*** 0.110  1.653*** 0.071 
Other higher degree  0.364*** 0.085  0.440*** 0.050 
 
 1.310*** 0.099  1.405*** 0.066 
A-level(s)  0.186* 0.104  0.215*** 0.057 
 
 1.053*** 0.115  1.008*** 0.073 
O-level(s)  0.382*** 0.097  0.429*** 0.060 
 
 0.650*** 0.107  0.692*** 0.075 
Other qualifications 0.119 0.118  0.182*** 0.069 
 
 0.373*** 0.130  0.393*** 0.091 
Married or 
partnered 0.221 0.145  0.294*** 0.078 
 
0.086 0.126  0.212*** 0.076 
Disability  -1.332*** 0.105  -1.298*** 0.059 
 
 -0.430*** 0.120  -0.405*** 0.077 
London  0.613*** 0.131  0.654*** 0.075 
 
 0.490*** 0.128  0.468*** 0.076 
South East 0.170 0.108  0.162*** 0.062 
 
 0.232** 0.096  0.359*** 0.060 
Unemployment rate  -9.553*** 3.190  -9.512*** 1.998 
 
 -6.487** 3.100  -3.775* 2.079 
Youngest child 0-2 0.159 0.162 0.108 0.093 
 
 -1.940*** 0.142  -2.026*** 0.089 
Youngest child 3-4 0.037 0.192 0.096 0.116 
 
 -1.293*** 0.157  -1.403*** 0.098 
Youngest child 5-11  0.278* 0.152  0.289*** 0.095 
 
 -0.828*** 0.133  -0.974*** 0.085 
Youngest child 12-16  0.486*** 0.145  0.444*** 0.094 
 
 -0.451*** 0.127  -0.553*** 0.087 
Youngest child 17-18 0.140 0.208 0.119 0.143 
 
-0.201 0.184  -0.269** 0.131 
Total children under 
19   -0.235*** 0.079  -0.231*** 0.048 
 
0.101 0.070  0.133*** 0.046 
Married or 
partnered: Mean 0.122 0.170 0.138 0.090 
 
0.016 0.149 -0.059 0.092 
Disability: Mean  -2.209*** 0.164  -2.295*** 0.095 
 
 -1.402*** 0.176  -1.553*** 0.114 
Total children: mean  0.243*** 0.074  0.260*** 0.044 
 
 -0.114* 0.066  -0.120*** 0.043 
Unemployed, t0  0.339*** 0.114  0.282*** 0.060 
 
0.125 0.158 0.040 0.092 
Self-employed, t0  1.802*** 0.109  1.749*** 0.065 
 
 1.449*** 0.098  1.395*** 0.068 
Low pay, t0  0.923*** 0.125  0.877*** 0.067 
 
 0.432*** 0.087  0.397*** 0.055 
Higher pay, t0  0.684*** 0.094  0.710*** 0.056 
 
 0.381*** 0.081  0.275*** 0.050 
Wave 3 0.237 0.189 0.213 0.159 
 
 0.568*** 0.183  0.563*** 0.161 
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Wave 4 0.132 0.189 0.107 0.156 
 
 0.572*** 0.174  0.600*** 0.149 
Wave 5 0.061 0.197 0.073 0.154 
 
 0.395** 0.184  0.431*** 0.152 
Wave 6 0.295 0.200  0.267* 0.156 
 
 0.486*** 0.185  0.551*** 0.151 
Wave 7 -0.282 0.212  -0.304* 0.160 
 
 0.408** 0.199  0.495*** 0.157 
Wave 8 -0.314 0.216  -0.323** 0.161 
 
0.188 0.209  0.289* 0.161 
Wave 9  -0.852*** 0.219  -0.886*** 0.163 
 
0.202 0.213  0.356** 0.160 
Wave 10  -0.473** 0.211  -0.513*** 0.158 
 
 0.381* 0.201  0.494*** 0.157 
Wave 11 -0.180 0.220 -0.217 0.164 
 
0.081 0.208 0.204 0.161 
Wave 12 -0.325 0.212 -0.237 0.155 
 
0.149 0.205 0.254 0.156 
Wave 13 -0.026 0.223 -0.048 0.158 
 
0.281 0.214  0.357** 0.160 
Wave 14  -0.734*** 0.230  -0.774*** 0.162 
 
0.102 0.221 0.247 0.163 
Wave 15 -0.146 0.231 -0.227 0.162 
 
0.205 0.222  0.343** 0.161 
Wave 16 -0.167 0.224 -0.217 0.157 
 
 0.396* 0.215  0.430*** 0.156 
Wave 17 -0.308 0.230  -0.472*** 0.157 
 
0.309 0.219  0.376** 0.158 
Wave 18 -0.198 0.221 -0.194 0.153 
 
0.138 0.209 0.127 0.152 
Constant  -1.488*** 0.369  -1.560*** 0.240 
 
 -3.260*** 0.354  -3.515*** 0.248 
Low paid employment 
        Unemployed, t-1  1.903*** 0.097  1.850*** 0.046 
 
 1.117*** 0.075  1.122*** 0.043 
Self-employed, t-1  3.371*** 0.123  3.198*** 0.066 
 
 1.912*** 0.099  2.059*** 0.065 
Low pay, t-1  4.809*** 0.109  4.765*** 0.060 
 
 3.617*** 0.045  3.642*** 0.027 
Higher pay, t-1  3.359*** 0.084  3.307*** 0.046 
 
 2.287*** 0.047  2.329*** 0.029 
Age 18-24  1.862*** 0.130  1.789*** 0.063 
 
 0.783*** 0.069  0.762*** 0.041 
Age 25-34  0.853*** 0.097  0.872*** 0.048 
 
 0.207*** 0.046  0.139*** 0.029 
Age 45-54  -0.616*** 0.092  -0.553*** 0.052 
 
 -0.519*** 0.054  -0.555*** 0.034 
Age 55 plus  -1.754*** 0.095  -1.668*** 0.052 
 
 -1.371*** 0.068  -1.347*** 0.041 
1st degree or higher  -0.340*** 0.103  -0.210*** 0.059 
 
 -0.213*** 0.070  -0.139*** 0.041 
Other higher degree  -0.334*** 0.076  -0.278*** 0.041 
 
 0.265*** 0.050  0.347*** 0.031 
A-level(s)  -0.390*** 0.094  -0.323*** 0.048 
 
 0.244*** 0.060  0.182*** 0.035 
O-level(s)  -0.148* 0.087 -0.063 0.049 
 
 0.121** 0.049  0.153*** 0.032 
Other qualifications  -0.245** 0.104  -0.180*** 0.058 
 
-0.012 0.058 0.023 0.036 
Married or 0.049 0.136 0.104 0.070 
 
 -0.150** 0.068  -0.068* 0.040 
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partnered 
Disability  -1.237*** 0.092  -1.143*** 0.048 
 
 -0.576*** 0.061  -0.561*** 0.037 
London -0.044 0.133 -0.006 0.075 
 
 -0.534*** 0.088  -0.570*** 0.053 
South East -0.116 0.109 -0.089 0.062 
 
 0.157*** 0.058  0.233*** 0.035 
Unemployment rate -1.193 3.005 -2.138 1.857 
 
 3.727** 1.703  6.904*** 1.080 
Youngest child 0-2 -0.002 0.158 0.040 0.085 
 
 -2.043*** 0.077  -2.166*** 0.045 
Youngest child 3-4 -0.033 0.191 0.047 0.116 
 
 -1.156*** 0.087  -1.285*** 0.051 
Youngest child 5-11 0.089 0.153 0.155 0.096 
 
 -0.468*** 0.073  -0.615*** 0.044 
Youngest child 12-16  0.433*** 0.142  0.377*** 0.092 
 
-0.028 0.073  -0.107** 0.045 
Youngest child 17-18 -0.026 0.213 -0.056 0.145 
 
0.139 0.106 0.100 0.072 
Total children under 
19   -0.225*** 0.079  -0.259*** 0.047 
 
0.040 0.035  0.057** 0.023 
Married or 
partnered: Mean -0.033 0.157 0.049 0.080 
 
0.101 0.081  0.087* 0.048 
Disability: Mean  -1.570*** 0.143  -1.720*** 0.077 
 
 -1.361*** 0.094  -1.462*** 0.060 
Total children: mean  0.231*** 0.073  0.245*** 0.043 
 
 -0.058* 0.034 -0.032 0.022 
Unemployed, t0  0.283*** 0.095  0.203*** 0.048 
 
 0.236*** 0.071  0.261*** 0.038 
Self-employed, t0  0.667*** 0.115  0.494*** 0.069 
 
 0.392*** 0.097  0.345*** 0.068 
Low pay, t0  0.967*** 0.107  0.858*** 0.055 
 
 0.752*** 0.043  0.750*** 0.027 
Higher pay, t0  0.345*** 0.084  0.298*** 0.049 
 
 0.286*** 0.044  0.187*** 0.027 
Wave 3 0.290 0.190  0.279* 0.158 
 
 0.277*** 0.100  0.274*** 0.087 
Wave 4  0.419** 0.189  0.404*** 0.154 
 
 0.272*** 0.100  0.298*** 0.085 
Wave 5 0.280 0.196  0.260* 0.153 
 
 0.286*** 0.103  0.331*** 0.084 
Wave 6  0.577*** 0.197  0.537*** 0.154 
 
 0.443*** 0.105  0.507*** 0.085 
Wave 7 0.233 0.206 0.183 0.157 
 
 0.276** 0.114  0.363*** 0.088 
Wave 8 0.323 0.210 0.230 0.158 
 
 0.415*** 0.115  0.510*** 0.088 
Wave 9 -0.199 0.212 -0.253 0.158 
 
 0.308*** 0.117  0.423*** 0.089 
Wave 10 0.177 0.205 0.107 0.155 
 
 0.406*** 0.115  0.520*** 0.088 
Wave 11  0.519** 0.212  0.420*** 0.159 
 
 0.531*** 0.118  0.658*** 0.090 
Wave 12 0.191 0.208  0.258* 0.150 
 
 0.448*** 0.117  0.549*** 0.086 
Wave 13  0.570*** 0.217  0.438*** 0.156 
 
 0.317*** 0.123  0.420*** 0.086 
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Wave 14 -0.187 0.223  -0.292* 0.159 
 
 0.308** 0.127  0.426*** 0.090 
Wave 15  0.601*** 0.224  0.499*** 0.158 
 
 0.363*** 0.126  0.460*** 0.089 
Wave 16 0.335 0.218 0.187 0.154 
 
 0.439*** 0.124  0.527*** 0.086 
Wave 17 0.208 0.224 0.109 0.154 
 
 0.431*** 0.126  0.503*** 0.087 
Wave 18  0.438** 0.217  0.288* 0.150 
 
 0.325*** 0.122  0.405*** 0.085 
Constant  -1.675*** 0.349  -1.596*** 0.229 
 
 -1.814*** 0.196  -2.143*** 0.132 
Higher paid 
employment 
         Unemployed, t-1  1.343*** 0.084  1.405*** 0.042 
 
 0.814*** 0.079  0.782*** 0.045 
Self-employed, t-1  2.337*** 0.111  2.245*** 0.062 
 
 1.326*** 0.104  1.376*** 0.068 
Low pay, t-1  3.737*** 0.101  3.802*** 0.059 
 
 2.648*** 0.047  2.630*** 0.027 
Higher pay, t-1  4.822*** 0.066  4.896*** 0.041 
 
 3.929*** 0.039  3.938*** 0.023 
Age 18-24  1.179*** 0.125  1.193*** 0.060 
 
 0.453*** 0.068  0.385*** 0.038 
Age 25-34  0.640*** 0.090  0.676*** 0.046 
 
 0.243*** 0.041  0.164*** 0.025 
Age 45-54  -0.790*** 0.082  -0.768*** 0.047 
 
 -0.734*** 0.052  -0.770*** 0.032 
Age 55 plus  -2.372*** 0.084  -2.300*** 0.047 
 
 -1.839*** 0.064  -1.832*** 0.037 
1st degree or higher  0.912*** 0.088  1.012*** 0.053 
 
 1.589*** 0.060  1.661*** 0.034 
Other higher degree  0.522*** 0.069  0.586*** 0.039 
 
 1.168*** 0.051  1.254*** 0.031 
A-level(s)  0.235*** 0.086  0.246*** 0.047 
 
 1.024*** 0.061  0.930*** 0.035 
O-level(s)  0.400*** 0.080  0.428*** 0.047 
 
 0.693*** 0.052  0.732*** 0.034 
Other qualifications 0.099 0.096 0.084 0.056 
 
 0.352*** 0.063  0.377*** 0.039 
Married or 
partnered 0.148 0.126  0.209*** 0.065 
 
 -0.165** 0.066 -0.042 0.038 
Disability  -1.396*** 0.079  -1.398*** 0.042 
 
 -0.668*** 0.058  -0.663*** 0.036 
London  0.406*** 0.113  0.383*** 0.066 
 
 0.128* 0.072 0.054 0.043 
South East  0.244*** 0.091  0.306*** 0.053 
 
 0.299*** 0.054  0.403*** 0.033 
Unemployment rate  -5.432** 2.674  -4.612*** 1.682 
 
 4.489*** 1.631  8.500*** 1.018 
Youngest child 0-2 0.115 0.146 0.085 0.083 
 
 -2.213*** 0.067  -2.272*** 0.039 
Youngest child 3-4 0.176 0.174  0.214** 0.107 
 
 -1.276*** 0.083  -1.400*** 0.047 
Youngest child 5-11  0.304** 0.139  0.347*** 0.089 
 
 -0.682*** 0.071  -0.829*** 0.040 
Youngest child 12-16  0.624*** 0.127  0.580*** 0.083 
 
-0.081 0.072  -0.163*** 0.046 
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Youngest child 17-18 0.246 0.187  0.247* 0.128 
 
0.126 0.103 0.091 0.071 
Total children under 
19   -0.282*** 0.070  -0.307*** 0.042 
 
 -0.075** 0.033  -0.066*** 0.021 
Married or 
partnered: Mean  0.283* 0.146  0.294*** 0.076 
 
0.114 0.078 0.050 0.045 
Disability: Mean  -2.189*** 0.121  -2.243*** 0.066 
 
 -1.744*** 0.091  -1.817*** 0.057 
Total children: mean  0.175*** 0.065  0.207*** 0.038 
 
 -0.066** 0.032  -0.049** 0.020 
Unemployed, t0 0.001 0.088 -0.001 0.044 
 
 0.239*** 0.074  0.221*** 0.039 
Self-employed, t0  0.566*** 0.105  0.457*** 0.062 
 
 0.391*** 0.101  0.325*** 0.070 
Low pay, t0  0.724*** 0.102  0.636*** 0.053 
 
 0.606*** 0.045  0.595*** 0.027 
Higher pay, t0  0.809*** 0.075  0.801*** 0.045 
 
 1.057*** 0.040  0.908*** 0.024 
Wave 3 0.176 0.159 0.156 0.133 
 
 0.324*** 0.096  0.297*** 0.084 
Wave 4 0.231 0.161  0.225* 0.131 
 
 0.287*** 0.097  0.293*** 0.083 
Wave 5 0.116 0.167 0.114 0.130 
 
 0.337*** 0.098  0.367*** 0.081 
Wave 6 0.239 0.169  0.235* 0.132 
 
 0.339*** 0.102  0.395*** 0.083 
Wave 7 0.007 0.177 0.026 0.135 
 
 0.415*** 0.110  0.512*** 0.086 
Wave 8 -0.014 0.183 -0.005 0.137 
 
 0.402*** 0.111  0.526*** 0.085 
Wave 9  -0.617*** 0.185  -0.599*** 0.137 
 
 0.265** 0.113  0.396*** 0.085 
Wave 10  -0.357** 0.177  -0.349*** 0.133 
 
 0.452*** 0.110  0.580*** 0.084 
Wave 11 -0.067 0.186 -0.070 0.138 
 
 0.516*** 0.114  0.671*** 0.086 
Wave 12 -0.173 0.180 -0.011 0.129 
 
 0.479*** 0.112  0.594*** 0.083 
Wave 13 0.064 0.188 -0.001 0.134 
 
 0.539*** 0.117  0.682*** 0.083 
Wave 14  -0.606*** 0.194  -0.575*** 0.137 
 
 0.468*** 0.119  0.628*** 0.084 
Wave 15 -0.129 0.196 -0.136 0.137 
 
 0.473*** 0.120  0.584*** 0.084 
Wave 16 -0.156 0.190 -0.172 0.133 
 
 0.536*** 0.118  0.612*** 0.083 
Wave 17 -0.262 0.195  -0.334** 0.134 
 
 0.496*** 0.119  0.586*** 0.083 
Wave 18 -0.154 0.189 -0.128 0.130 
 
 0.419*** 0.115  0.473*** 0.080 
Constant -0.425 0.307  -0.620*** 0.203    -2.191*** 0.189  -2.503*** 0.125 
 
 
 
